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Federal Procurement of Environmental
Remediation Services: Feast or Famine
for Small Business
DANIELLE CONVAY=JONES*
New forces such as globalization, the rise of new technologies, and
the development of new markets are shaping a new American econ-
omy. Small firms, with their nimbleness, adaptability, and creativ-
ity, will play an increasingly important role in that new economy.
President William J. Clinton'
INTRODUCTION
Environmental remediation service' is an emerging industry that
owes the majority of its existence to a labyrinth of federal laws, stat-
utes, and regulations. Environmental remediation services consist of
work identified with a number of different functions performed to re-
store a contaminated environment.3 These functions include, but are
* Assistant Professor of Legal Research and Writing, Georgetown University Law
Center. I wish to thank Christopher L Jones, Jr., Esq. for reading and commenting on many
rewrites of this article. I also wish to thank Professors Fred J. Lees, Elizabeth Glass-Geltman,
Jill J. Ramsfield, Dean Judith Areen, and Associate Dean Anita Allen for their comments and
support. This article was funded, in part, by a Georgetown University Law Center summer re-
search stipend. Finally, I wish to thank Patricia Tobin for her excellent research ideas and David
W. Hanson, Esq. for his critical and thoughtful comments.
1. THE COUNCIL ON ENvmoNmENrrAL QuALITY, ENVIRONMENrAL QUALITY Twmrry-
FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT (1993). The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) is a staff of-
fice of the Executive Office of the President created by The National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA). See 42 U.S.C. § 4342 (1994). The purpose of the CEQ is to provide a consistent and
expert source of review of national policies, environmental problems, and trends, both long-term
and short-term. 115 CoNe. REc. 26,572 (1969) (statement of Rep. Dingell).
2. Environmental remediation services are defined under (or more clearly are a sub-cate-
gory of) Facilities Support Management Services which is itself identified by Standard Industrial
Classification (SIC) code 8744. The Facility Support Management Services category is a compo-
nent of Facilities Management. See 13 C.F.R. § 121.601 (1995).
3. See Small Business Size Standards: Environmental Remediation Services, 59 Fed. Reg.
47,236 (1994) (codified at 13 C.F.R. pt. 121).
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not limited to, preliminary assessments,4 site inspections and testing,5
remedial investigations, 6 feasibility studies,7 remedial design,8 contain-
ment,9 remedial actions,10 transportation and disposal of waste materi-
als," security,12 and site close outs. 13
4. A preliminary assessment is a limited scope investigation designed to distinguish be-
tween sites that pose little or no threat to human health and the environment and sites that
require further investigation. The preliminary assessment is typically based on installation
records searches, visual site inspections, and interviews of site personnel. See DEmNsE ENV.
RoNMENTAL RESTORATION PROGRAM: ANNUAL REPORT FOR FIscAL YEAR 1994 (Mar. 31,
1995) [hereinafter DERP REPORT FY94].
5. "[W]henever the President has reason to believe that a release has occurred, or is about
to occur, or that illness, disease or complaints thereof may be attributable to exposure to a
hazardous substance, pollutant or contaminant, [the EPA or other federal agency] may under-
take such investigations, monitoring, surveys, testing, and other information gathering as ... may
[be] deem[ed] necessary or appropriate to identify the existence and extent of release or threat
thereof, the source and nature of the hazardous substances, pollutants or contaminants involved,
and the extent of danger to the public health or welfare or to the environment." 42 U.S.C.
§ 9604(b)(1).
6. A remedial investigation is designed to assess the nature and extent of releases of haz-
ardous substances, and determine those areas of a site where releases have created damage or
the threat of damage to public health or the environment. It is during the remedial investigation
that extensive solid and groundwater sampling is performed and voluminous reports detailing
the results of these investigations are prepared. The overall purpose of the remedial investiga-
tion is to collect data necessary to adequately characterize a site for the purpose of developing
and evaluating effective remedial alternatives. See 8 Robert T. Lee, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
HANDBOOK: COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION AND LABILrrY
Acr 233-36 (Thomas F.P. Sullivan ed., 13th ed. 1995).
7. The objective of a feasibility study is to develop a range of remedial alternatives for
consideration. The feasibility study evaluates, in detail, potential remedies for the site, taking
into account the findings of the remedial investigation. Id. The feasibility study is divided into
two phases for evaluating remedial alternatives. The first phase is the initial screening of all
alternatives. The second phase is the detailed analysis of the alternatives. The detailed analysis,
among other things, considers cost-effectiveness, short and long-term effectiveness, and overall
protection of human health and the environment. See DERP REPORT FY94, supra note 4.
8. During the remedial design phase, a design of the cleanup remedy is developed. The
design phase includes preparation of all technical drawings and specifications needed to imple-
ment the cleanup action. See DERP REPORT FY94, supra note 4.
9. Containment is a remedial action used to isolate hazardous substances to assure the
protection of public health and welfare, and the environment. See 42 U.S.C. § 9604(b)(1).
10. Remedial actions are consistent with permanent remedies, i.e., cleanups, taken "in the
event of a release or threatened release of a hazardous substance into the environment, to pre-
vent or minimize... [t]he substantial danger to present or future public health or welfare or the
- environment." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24). A remedial action involves the construction, operation,
and implementation of the final cleanup remedy. Long term remedial actions require continued
monitoring, operation, and maintenance for a number of years. See DERP REPORT FY94, supra
note 4.
11. "'[Tiransportation' means movement of a hazardous substance by any mode ...." 42
U.S.C. § 9601(26). "Disposal" is defined as the "discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling,
leaking, or placing of any solid or hazardous waste into or on any land or water so that such solid
waste or hazardous waste or any constituent thereof may enter the environment ...." 42 U.S.C.
§ 6903(3).
12. Generally, "security" includes construction of fences or providing guard services on site.
A contractor that receives award of a remediation or response action contract must provide site
security. Security provisions must be made on a site by site basis. A contractor must maintain a
site and all other contractor controlled areas in such a manner as to minimize the risk of injury
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To date, the environmental remediation services industry has
been primarily dominated by very large firms. 14 Larger firms have
secured almost all of the environmental remediation contracts let by
the federal government. However, despite large business involvement
in multi-discipline environmental remediation contracts, small busi-
nesses, especially engineering firms and laboratories, have provided
initial services in this industry. Small businesses were among the first
to recognize the growth potential of the environmental remediation
service industry in both the public and private sectors.
15
The environmental remediation services industry is fueled by
many market participants. Both the private and public sectors have a
growing need for environmental remediation services because of busi-
ness or national security practices that have caused degradation and
destruction of the environment. 16 The growth in the environmental
remediation services industry will bring lucrative opportunities for
small businesses. Continued consumer concern for the environment
may also provide additional opportunities for small businesses, from
producing environmentally correct products and packaging to offering
consulting and contracting services.' 7 This article focuses on the op-
or accident to site personnel or others who may be in the area of the site. On military installa-
tions, a contractor must comply with the security requirements of the particular installation
where the site is located. See U.S. ARNty Corts OF ENGnEERS, IssouRi RrVER DmVsioN,
AcotnsrobN PLAN FOR TOTAL ENVIRoNmI~ENTAL REs-roRA-roN ComrRucrs (Rev. 10, Jan. 7,
1993, amended Jan. 25, 1993) (hereinafter TERC ACQUISrON PLAN].
13. At the end of contract performance, the prime contractor is required to prepare a
remediation close-out report consisting of information developed and maintained over the
course of the restoration project. This report, in essence, is an after-action report which provides
the government with vital information for future use regarding the phases of the site remedia-
tion. Id.
14. Jumms C. DoBs, GoVERmNrr ENVIRONMENTAL CONTRACTING (Federal Publications
1990).
15. Interview with Paul D. Lumpkin, President and CEO of Plexus Engineering, Inc., for-
merly known as Plexus Scientific Corp. (May 17, 1995). Mr. Lumpkin's firm is a member of the
Hazardous Waste Action Coalition (HWAC). Mr. Lumpkin has provided engineering services
to the public and private sectors for over 10 years, and his firm currently operates as a member
of the 8(a) program administered by the Small Business Administration.
16. Steven A. Herman, Environmental Cleanup and Compliance at Federal Facilities: An
EPA Perspective, 24 ENvrt. L. REP. 1097 (1994) (The author summarily states that although
federal agencies, like DoD, are giving attention to environmental issues, this has not always been
the case. In many respects, agencies are playing catch up and are paying for the sins of omission
and commission of their predecessors.). But cf. DERP REPORT FY94, supra note 4, at iii (De-
fense Secretary Perry states that the contamination of military installations occurred as a direct
result of military activities that benefitted the nation by ending communism abroad and provid-
ing opportunities for the birth of new democracies, and there were environmental costs associ-
ated with these momentous victories.).
17. Michele Liberti-Lansing, Experts Zero in on Good Areas for Small Business, CAP. DisT.
Bus. REv., Nov. 29, 1993, at 15.
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portunities that presently exist in the federal procurement system for
small businesses either already engaged in the environmental
remediation field or seeking entry into the field after having provided
services loosely related to environmental remediation.' 8
Although the history of the environmental remediation industry
is brief, part one of this article will discuss its origin and the catalysts
that brought this industry to the forefront of both the environmental
and federal procurement fields. Part two will provide a practical
guide to the small business requirements in the federal procurement
process. Part three of this article offers a description of the most cur-
rent and notable types of environmental remediation contracts. Part
four discusses pertinent federal government policies regarding the
ongoing development of small businesses in the environmental
remediation services industry. Part five discusses the impediments to
and the obstacles faced by small businesses seeking growth or entry
into the federal environmental remediation services industry. Finally,
part six of this article provides recommendations to promote meaning-
ful small business participation in the environmental remediation
services industry.
This author concludes that, while small businesses have the po-
tential to offer quality remediation services to the federal government,
large federal "mega" remediation services contracts will continue to
thwart meaningful participation by these firms in the environmental
cleanup industry. In order to capture the superior resources within
small firms that can provide cleanup services, the federal government
will have to exploit its regulations and policies to stir opportunities for
small firms that, although able and willing, cannot feasibly compete
against large firms for federal environmental remediation services
contracts.
I. THE GENESIS OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL
REMEDIATION SERVICES INDUSTRY
In 1962, in a book entitled Silent Spring,19 Rachel Carson intro-
duced the world to the public policy phenomenon called "the environ-
18. Industries where small firms provide some environmental remediation work include,
but are not limited to, the following: Commercial, Physical, and Biological Research; Base Main-
tenance; Engineering Services; Architectural Services; Sanitary Services; Refuse Systems; Local
Trucking without Storage; Wrecking and Demolition; Special Trade Contractors; and Heavy
Construction. See 13 C.F.R. pt. 121.601.
19. RACHEL CARSON, Smabrr SPRING (1962).
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ment." Carson's work has been credited as altering the course of
history.2" After its publication in 1962, the environmental movement
was conceived. Revolutionary changes in the laws affecting the air,
land, and water were about to take place.2 ' Rachel Carson's view of
the destruction of the environment drew monumental attention from
both the federal government and the public. In large part, Carson's
concerns about, and her eloquent arguments against the pollution of
the earth, prompted the creation of the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) in 1970.22
Shortly thereafter came the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA),23 which was signed into law by President Richard Nixon in
1970.24 NEPA addressed the need for a national environmental pol-
icy.25 NEPA was the first comprehensive attempt to legislate a na-
tional policy toward protecting the quality of the environment.26 As
such, NEPA has an important, if only indirect, effect on the federal
government's management of the cleanup of this country's environ-
ment.27 NEPA requires that any proposed federal action that signifi-
cantly impacts the environment must be studied.' The very mandate
to study impacts of proposed major federal action finds its way into
the area of remediation because, as a condition precedent to perform-
ing remedial work at a site, federal agencies must evaluate other
alternatives.
On the heels of NEPA came, inter alia, the Clean Air Act 29 and
the Clean Water Act.30 Years later, the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA)31 and the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
20. Al Gore, Introduction to RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962).
21. Id.
22. The EPA was created by Presidential Order, Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1970, 3 C.F.R. § 199
(1971), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 1132 (1982), borrowing authorities and programs from the De-
partments of Agriculture and Health, Education, and Welfare, the Federal Radiation Council,
and the Atomic Energy Commission, on recommendation of the Ash Council. See Frederick R.
Anderson, Negotiation and Informal Agency Action: The Case of Superfund, 1985 DUKE LJ.
261, 267 (citing COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT, 24-26 (1970)
(detailing the consolidation into the EPA); 40 C.F.R. § 1.49 (1984) (EPA regulations on organi-
zation and general information)).
23. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370.
24. 10 JAMES W. SPENSLEY, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK, THE NATIONAL ENVIRON-
MENTAL POLICY ACT 308 (Thomas F.P. Sullivan ed., 13th ed. 1995).
25. Id.
26. Donas, supra note 14.
27. id.
28. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1994).
29. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1994).
30. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994).
31. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1994).
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sponse, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA)3 2 were enacted.
All of these statutes contain a study and analysis phase, which must be
completed before actual remediation can occur.
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act was enacted in
1976 and has since been significantly amended.33 The RCRA pro-
vided the EPA with authority to regulate the disposal of waste materi-
als on land. This Act's jurisdiction extends to ongoing activities of
waste management facilities. Although differing and sometimes over-
lapping requirements exist, the RCRA also provides authority for the
investigation and cleanup of past waste sites, creating a corrective ac-
tion program substantially equivalent to that of CERCLA."4
In contrast, CERCLA was enacted to deal with environmental
contamination at abandoned disposal sites. CERCLA provides the
federal government with the authority to deal effectively with uncon-
trolled releases of hazardous substances into the environment.3 5
CERCLA was designed to function as a remedial statute authorizing
the federal government, state governments, and, in certain situations,
private parties, to respond to and cleanup hazardous substances in the
water, air, and on land.
36
The heart of CERCLA is its "Superfund," developed to finance
government response actions.3 7 The Superfund has been primarily
funded by a broad range of taxes.3 8 The Superfund cannot be used to
pay for remedial actions with respect to federally owned facilities.3 9
However, the Superfund can be used if a federal agency embarks on
the cleanup of a site on the National Priorities List (NPL) that is not a
32. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (1994).
33. Since its passage into law, the RCRA has been amended in 1978, 1980, 1984, and 1988.
These amendments are contained in The Quiet Communities Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-609, 92
Stat. 3801; The Solid Waste Disposal Act Amendment of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-482, 94 Stat. 2334;
The Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221; and
finally, The Federal Facilities Compliance Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-386, 106 Stat. 1505.
34. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6924(v), 6991b.
35. See 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1).
36. Id.
37. Pub. L. No. 96-510, § 111, 94 Stat. 2788, 2788-90 (1980). "
38. See 42 U.S.C. § 9611(a). The Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act estab-
lished an $8.5 billion fund for five years. See Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986); see also
infra note 48. Congress authorized $5.1' billion for an extension of the fund through September
1994. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 6301, 104 Stat.
1388, 1388. The Superfund is augmented by taxes on petroleum, taxes on imported chemicals, a
broad-based corporate environmental tax, and monies recouped by the U.S. Department of Jus-
tice through cost recovery actions. See generally RtwDWAy M. HALL, JR. ET Ai-, GovERNMENT
INsTrruT, IN C., SuPERPLrND MANUAL: LEGAL AND MANAGEMENT SmrATEwms (5th ed. 1993).
39. See 42 U.S.C. § 9611(e)(3).
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federally owned facility.40 The source of funding to conduct cleanups
of federally owned facilities is the federal agency's own budget. For
example, the Department of Energy (DOE) has received approxi-
mately $6.2 billion as of fiscal year 1994 for environmental restora-
tion,4 1 while the Department of Defense (DoD) has received
appropriations totaling approximately $4.5 billion for its environmen-
tal restoration program.42
CERCLA authorizes the federal government to take action in re-
sponse to the release or substantial threat of release into the environ-
ment of any hazardous substance which may present an imminent and
substantial danger to the public health or welfare.43 If a party respon-
sible for a release or threat of release cannot be found or fails to act in
accordance with the EPA's administrative orders,44 the federal gov-
ernment can perform the cleanup work itself and then seek
reimbursement.45
While the EPA administers cleanups pursuant to Superfund, 46
DoD has its own significant responsibilities in the environmental
cleanup arena.47 In 1986, the ninety-ninth Congress passed the
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA),48 which
established the Defense Environmental Restoration Program
(DERP).4 9 Pursuant to the DERP, DoD is obligated to ensure that it
effectively performs its own hazardous substance cleanups, response
actions, and investigations at facilities owned by, leased to, or other-
40. See 42 U.S.C. § 9611(a). CERCLA permits the federal government to use Superfund
dollars for the provision of alternative water supplies in any case involving groundwater contam-
ination outside the boundaries of a federally owned facility in which the federally owned facility
is not the only potentially responsible party. See 42 U.S.C. § 9611(e)(3).
41. See generally Herman, supra note 16.
42. Id.; see also Budget of the United States Government 111 (Fiscal Year 1994). Congress
has provided funds in two accounts to support DoD's environmental restoration program. These
accounts are the Defense Environmental Restoration Account and the Base Realignment and
Closure Account. See DERP REPORT FY94, supra note 4.
43. See 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a).
44. The EPA has the option to issue administrative orders or initiate civil actions to compel
responsible parties to undertake cleanup of contamination created by their actions. See 42
U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1988); see generally Eugene P. Brantly, Note, Superfund Cost Recovery: May
the Government Recover "All Costs" Incurred Under Response Contracts?, 59 GEo. WASH. L
REv. 968 (1991).
45. A responsible party is liable for all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the
United States Government or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the national con-
tingency plan. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a), (c).
46. See 42 U.S.C. H4 9601-9675.
47. See Exec. Order No. 12,580, 52 Fed. Reg. 2923 (1987).
48. Pub. L No. 99-499, § 211(a)(1)(B), 100 Stat. 1719, 1719 (1986).
49. See 10 U.S.C. § 2701(a).
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wise possessed by DoD.50 The DERP receives its financial support
from the Defense Environmental Restoration Account (DERA or
transfer account) which is primarily funded 5  by congressional
appropriations.52
The federal government's, and particularly DoD's, environmental
cleanup obligations increasingly have become significant since the en-
actment of RCRA, CERCLA, and SARA. To meet its expansive
cleanup obligation, DoD relies extensively on its procurement sys-
tem.53 This system employs contractors possessing the technical ex-
pertise and ability to provide quality studies, remedial investigations,
design, remedial action, and short term operation and maintenance to
cleanup contaminated sites on military installations.54
A. The Federal Procurement System
Government procurement reaches back to the inception of this
nation. One of the federal government's initial procurements was ad-
vertised by the Postmaster General for mail service contracts. 55 Gov-
ernment procurement has since evolved into a system of complex
statutes, regulations, and decisions designed specifically to protect
those who deal with the federal government as suppliers, as well as to
protect the public's interests.
Contracts made by the United States are generally entered into
by individual organizations within all three branches of the federal
government.56 These organizations are varied in nature, ranging from
established departments to recently formed corporations. 57 Congress
50. The President issued Executive Order 12580 in January 1987 directing the Secretary of
Defense to implement investigation and cleanup measures in consultation with the EPA for re-
leases of hazardous substances from facilities under the jurisdiction of the Secretary. DoD refers
to the program for meeting its responsibilities under CERCLA as the Installation Restoration
Program (IRP). 10 U.S.C. § 2701(a).
51. See 10 U.S.C. § 2703(c) (amounts recovered under § 107 of CERCLA for response ac-
tions of the Secretary of Defense are to be credited back to the transfer account).
52. See 10 U.S.C. § 2703(a), Pub. L. No. 103-335, 108 Stat. 2605 (1994). Congress's appro-
priations for the Defense Environmental Restoration Account vary from year to year. For ex-
ample, Congress appropriated $1.78 billion to DERA in 1994. This appropriation was to be used
for DoD-wide cleanups. 10 U.S.C. § 2703(a). In 1995, Congress appropriated $1.42 billion for
environmental cleanup pursuant to DERA. See H.R. Co'w. REP. No. 104-61 (1995).
53. See DERP REPORT FY94, supra note 4.
54. Id.
55. See 1 Stat. 235 (1792); see also G. BROCKWEL-HEYLIN, THE Comi'zrrrrvE BIDDING
PRocEss-AN ENDANGERED SPECI.S (1981).





has not adopted one procurement statute for the entire federal gov-
ernment.58 Historically, the two major statutes covering most of gov-
ernment procurement were the Armed Services Procurement Act
(ASPA) 59 and the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act
(FPASA).60
Then, in 1984, Congress enacted the Competition in Contracting
Act 61 to amend and harmonize the ASPA and the FPASA.62 It is this
very system that the federal government relies upon to procure envi-
ronmental remediation services.
B. Traditional Environmental Remediation Contracts
The need for scientific and technical expertise in performing DoD
environmental cleanups was the seed that sprouted into the federal
environmental remediation services industry.63 This industry has seen
significant growth to date.64 When the EPA or other federal agencies
decide to cleanup a Superfund or other site65 using government
funds,66 they call upon the services of private engineering and envi-
ronmental firms to evaluate site conditions and select, design, and im-
plement appropriate remedies.67 Specifically, when DoD sets out to
cleanup contaminated sites on installations, it also uses engineering.
and environmental firms to analyze sites and propose alternatives for
remediation. In fact, engineering firms provided some of the first
remediation services, that is, environmental studies, to the federal
government as it embarked on its cleanup mission.68 Once the envi-
ronmental study and evaluation phases of the government's initial
contracts were completed, its focus had to shift to actual cleanup and
58. Id.
59. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2331.
60. See 41 U.S.C. §§ 251-266.
61. Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 1175 (1984).
62. CmInI, supra note 56.
63. GuIDE TO DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ENVIRONMENTAL PROCUREMENTS: MAKING THE
MosT OF YouR OPPORTuNrrms (1995).
64. See 58 Fed. Reg. 4074 (1993).
65. The EPA is not required to perform cleanups of sites that have been placed on the NPL.
Rather, the EPA has the option to either issue administrative orders or initiate civil actions to
compel a potentially responsible party to cleanup the site or pay for the cleanup if it is unable to
perform the work itself. See 42 U.S.C. § 9605.
66. See 42 U.S.C. § 9611(a)(1).
67. U.S. General Accounting Office, Superfund Contracts: EPA Needs to Control Contrac-
tor Costs, REP. To CONo., GAO Rep. No. RCED-88-182 (July 1988).
68. Mary Buckner Powers & Debra K. Rubin, Environmental Service Firms Change Along
With Markets, ENGINEERING NEws-REcORD, Feb. 21, 1994, at 48.
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restoration of contaminated sites.69 This final phase of remediation
proves to be the most difficult aspect of completing environmental
cleanups.
The program that emerged to deal with the actual nuts and bolts
of environmental cleanup was the Hazardous, Toxic, and Radioactive
Waste (HTRW) cleanup program.70 The HTRW program is adminis-
tered government-wide by the Environmental Protection Agency.
DoD implemented the HTRW program through its Installation Resto-
ration Program. DoD uses the Installation Restoration Program to
react to the requirement to cleanup land contaminated as a result of
military activity. DoD is charged with the responsibility to cleanup its
contaminated installations. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
(Corps or Corps of Engineers) shoulders the responsibility to manage
the cleanup of many DoD installations. 71
The Corps assists many agencies in the execution of their envi-
ronmental cleanup programs.72 These agencies include: the U.S. En-
vironmental Protection Agency; the Department of Energy; the
General Services Administration; the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion; and the Department of Commerce.73 These agencies are custom-
ers of the Corps74 and have recently requested greater degrees of
assistance from the Corps in support of their respective HTRW pro-
grams.75 All HTRW programs administered throughout the federal
government continue to increase with the growing emphasis on envi-
ronmental restoration. The HTRW work load associated with each
federal agency seeking assistance combines to place a tremendous
burden on the Corps' contracting activities, such as awarding environ-
mental remediation contracts.
69. Id.
70. The HTRW program provides for investigations and analyses of sites to determine the
level and extent of contamination. Sites are then identified for cleanup and the nature and
extent of cleanup. Finally, a proper approach to cleanup is determined, which then allows agen-
cies to begin the task of performing remedial actions. See DERP REPORT FY94, supra note 4.
71. See TERC AcQUmsrTIoN PLAN, supra note 12.
72. Id. Many of the sites and projects managed by the Corps are on the U.S. EPA National
Priorities List and are covered by negotiated Federal Facility Agreements between Corps cus-
tomers and regulatory agencies. Id
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. The Corps has a history of providing engineering and construction services to the
Nation. In the past decade, the Corps added environmental remediation as one of its numerous
missions. Other agencies seek the Corps' assistance in environmental remediation, because the




C. A Growing Demand for Mainstream Environmental
Remediation Services Contracts
In all of its procurements, DoD uses two basic contract types.
The first is the fixed price contract,76 and the second is the cost reim-
bursement contract. 7 The "firm, fixed price" contract is the most
common type of government contract; the price is firm for the dura-
tion of the contract and the only adjustments that can be made are
authorized changes.71 It is under the fixed price contract that the con-
tractor bears the risk of the cost of performance.79 Under this type of
contract, the contractor assumes the maximum risk of profit, or loss,
including the risk of unexpected costs such as those that might result
from inflation or material shortages."0 Fixed price contracts are used
by DoD when the cost of performance is reasonably predictable and
when adequate, functional, and detailed specifications are available.,,
Under a cost reimbursement contract, DoD reimburses a contrac-
tor for the allowable incurred costs of performance. 82 A contractor's
costs, however, can only be reimbursed in accordance with certain
cost accounting principles.8' Cost reimbursable contracts place the
maximum risk of cost and completed performance on the govern-
ment.s4 For example, the government may be required to pay costs,
beyond those anticipated, because the contractor incurred additional
costs in order to complete performance.
The Corps of Engineers favors the use of fixed price construction
contracts for its military and civil works procurements. The Corps ini-
tially awarded fixed price contracts to firms providing environmental
remediation services, because most cleanup work was and remains
construction based. However, the uncertainty of remedial or response
76. See Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), 48 C.F.R. pt. 16.2-Fixed Price Contracts
(1994).
77. See FAR, 48 C.F.R. pt. 16.3--Cost Reimbursement Contracts.
78. See FAR, 48 C.F.R. pt. 43.201. Most DoD contracts contain a changes clause. The
changes clause incorporated in a contract varies according to the type of contract. See FAR, 48
C.F.R. pt. 43.205. Generally, a changes clause authorizes a contracting officer to order a contrac-
tor to make changes "within the general scope of the contract." See FAR 48 C.F.R. pt. 52.243
("Changes. A change is considered to be within the scope of the contract if the change is re-
garded as fair and reasonable, and within the contemplation of the parties upon entering into the
contract."). See Planned Environmental Design Corp., ASBCA Nos. 47559, 48746, 96-1 BCA J
28,001 (Oct. 2, 1995).
79. See FAR, 48 C.F.R. pt. 16.202-1.
80. See FAR, 48 C.F.R. pt. 16.202.
81. See FAR, 48 C.F.R. pt. 16.202-2(a)-(d).
82. See FAR, 48 C.F.R. pt. 16.301-1.
83. See FAR, 48 C.F.R. pt. 31.
84. See FAR, 48 C.F.R. pt. 16.301-1.
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action requires a flexible contract tool to account for unforeseen cost
and performance contingencies. Simply stated, most environmental
projects do not fit the mold of a fixed price construction contract, be-
cause this work requires non-routine services, the cost of which cannot
be estimated accurately before commencing performance.
DoD, like other federal agencies, relies on and utilizes fixed price
contracts to satisfy its executive agency requirements. These agencies
have become comfortable with the administration of this contract type
when contracting for work other than actual cleanup. In fact, the
fixed price contract type has often worked well for the federal govern-
ment, in areas other than actual cleanup, because the risks associated
with cost and performance remained with the contractor. For exam-
ple, the Corps of Engineers, in its initial support of the HTRW pro-
gram, performed environmental remediation work using a standard
two contract approach.85 First, the Corps awarded a fixed price design
contract, issued pursuant to Brooks Act, Architect-Engineer (A-E)
procedures.8 6 The work under this contract encompassed, among
other things, site investigations, studies, and determinations regarding
most favorable remedial alternatives. The second instrument awarded
was a fixed price, competitive construction contract to the low
bidder.87
Unfortunately, performance of environmental remediation work
pursuant to a fixed price contract often has resulted in both the fed-
eral government and the contractor receiving less than what each bar-
gained for.8 The majority of the fixed price environmental
85. See TERC ACQUIsIToN PLAN, supra note 12.
86. See 40 U.S.C. § 541 (1994); FAR, 48 C.F.R. pt. 36.601-2 to 36.601-3; Department of
Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS), 48 C.F.R. pt. 236.602.
87. This type of award is made pursuant to either sealed bidding or negotiated procurement
procedures. Sealed bidding is a method of contracting that results in the award of a contract "to
that responsible bidder whose bid, conforming to the invitation for bids, is most advantageous to
the Government, considering only price and the price-related factors included in the invitation
[for bids]." See FAR, 48 C.F.R. pt. 14.101(e). Some remedial construction contracts were
awarded on a competitive, negotiated basis. See TERC AcQuisnoN PLAN, supra note 12. "Ne-
gotiadon means contracting through the use of either competitive or other than competitive
proposals and discussions." FAR, 48 C.F.R. pt. 15.101. "Negotiation is a procedure that in-
cludes the receipt of proposals from offerors, permits bargaining, and usually affords offerors an
opportunity to revise their offers before award of a contract." FAR, 48 C.F.R. pt. 15.102.
88. Jeffrey W. Hills, Leaning Forward in the Foxhole (Oct. 1995) (on file with the Military
Engineer). At the time of this writing, Major Jeffrey W. Hills was the Headquarters, Deputy
Chief, Contract Policy Division, Principal Assistant Responsible for Contracting (PARC). Major
Hills is a graduate of The United States Military Academy. He holds a dual Masters degree in
Engineering and Business Administration, and is a licensed engineer in the Commonwealth of
Virginia. Prior to his assignment as the Deputy PARC, he was the Deputy Chief, U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers, Kansas City District, responsible for HTRW design and response.
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remediation contracts have been less than successful 9 due to the ad-
vent of unknown conditions that surfaced during contract perform-
ance. 90 These unknown conditions often have caused contracts to
balloon in cost, scope, claims, and litigation. 91
Federal agencies concluded that environmental remediation work
does not lend itself to quantifiable measures of known contaminants. 92
Thus, federal agencies developed new contracting methods in re-
sponse to the undefinable nature of remediation and removal projects
and the limited amount of historical data.93 Furthermore, because of
the uncertainties associated with remediation, many different types of
contracts are needed to facilitate the large and varied HTRW cleanup
contracting programs instituted throughout the federal government.
In some cases, a cleanup project may be accomplished by using a com-
bination of existing A-E and sealed bidding procedures. 94 However,
this acquisition strategy may work well only if the cleanup is routine,
minimum uncertainties exist, and sufficient acquisition lead time is
available.9 In a situation where many factors remain variable in the
cleanup process, simplistic acquisition techniques will and have be-
come useless.
By definition, much of the material involved in hazardous sub-
stance cleanup may be harmful or even lethal to humans, the environ-
ment, or both.96 This frequently means that time is of the essence in
selecting an appropriate acquisition strategy and executing the acqui-
sition process.97 This intuitively means that sealed bidding or negoti-
ated procurements, either alone or combined, probably would not be
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. With fixed price contracts, the contractor must anticipate the possibility of failures
and difficulties by including contingency amounts in its price. Because the government would be
required to pay the fixed price whether or not the contingency occurs, the contractor might
receive a handsome premium for the environmental remediation services. Alternatively, if the
work proved more difficult, for instance, because of a differing site condition, the government
would then have to pay on the contractor's claim. Il
92. See TERC Acauismor PLAN, supra note 12.
93. See infra Part III.
94. See TERC AcQcussmoN PLAN, supra note 12. A fixed price Architect-Engineer (A-E)
design contract is issued under Brooks Act procedures. See 40 U.S.C. §§ 541-544. The Brooks
Act requires agencies to select an A-E contractor for a project on the basis of qualifications. See
FAR, 48 C.F.RL pt. 36.606(e). The A-E contract is then followed by a fixed price construction
contract issued to the lowest bidder. "No contract for the construction of a project shall be
awarded to the firm that designed the project or its subsidiaries or affiliates, except with the
approval of the head of the agency or authorized representative." FAR, 48 C.F.R. pt. 36.209.





the fastest, most efficient, nor technically appropriate method to ac-
complish the required remedial action that would reduce the dangers
a hazardous substance may present to human health or the
environment.
In the late seventies, several different innovative contracting
methods were developed to meet new and growing cleanup require-
ments. The EPA spearheaded these efforts. New contracting tools in-
cluded large indefinite-delivery, 98  architect-engineer, fixed price
contracts and even larger indefinite-delivery type, remedial action
contracts.99 These remedial action contracts contained flexible pricing
arrangements in that a delivery order could be issued on a cost plus,
fixed price, or fixed unit price basis.100 Remedial action contracts in-
corporated both service and construction clauses that provided flexi-
bility to issue service and/or construction delivery orders as
acquisition conditions dictated.' Since the time remedial action con-
tracts were approved for use, many different contract types based on
the indefinite-delivery type concept have been awarded by the Corps,
the Navy, the Air Force, and non-DoD agencies.'0 2
98. "There are three types of indefinite-delivery contracts: Definite-quantity contracts, re-
quirements contracts, and indefinite-quantity contracts. The appropriate type of indefinite-de-
livery contract may be used to acquire supplies and/or services when the exact times and/or
quantities of future deliveries are not known at the time of contract award." FAR, 48 C.F.R. pt.
16.501-2(a). Most response or remedial actions require the use of indefinite-quantity contracts,
because the quantity of remedial work required by the government is unknown. Regarding in-
definite-quantity contracts, FAR, 48 C.F.R. pt. 16.504 states:
(a) Description. An indefinite-quantity contract provides for indefinite quantity,
within stated limits, of supplies or services to be furnished during a fixed period,
with deliveries or performance to be scheduled by placing orders with the
contractor.
(1) The contract shall require the Government to order and the contractor to fur-
nish at least a stated minimum quantity of supplies or services and, if and as
ordered, the contractor to furnish any additional quantities not to exceed a
stated maximum .... [The stated] maximum quantity should be realistic and
based on the most current information available.
(2) To ensure that the contract is binding, the minimum quantity must be more
than a nominal quantity, but it should not exceed the amount that the Govern-
ment is fairly certain to order.
(b) An indefinite quantity contract may be used when the Government cannot prede-
termine, above a specific minimum, the precise quantities of supplies or services
that will be required during the contract period, and it is inadvisable for the Gov-
ernment to commit itself for more than a minimum quantity. An indefinite quan-
tity contract should be used only when a recurring need is anticipated. Funds for
other than the stated minimum quantity are obligated by each delivery order, not
by the contract itself.
99. See DoBas, supra note 14.
100. Id. This flexibility allows a contracting officer to use business judgment to determine
which pricing arrangement is best suited for the work required under a specific delivery order.
Id.
101. Id.
102. See infra Part III.
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The Corps of Engineers began to design its own innovative con-
tracting instruments to procure environmental remediation services in
response to EPA successes. The Corps developed the Total Environ-
mental Restoration Contract (TERC).03 The Corps believes that,
with the implementation of TERCs, it can and has been able to cut
cleanup schedules and budgets, improve contractor performance, and
generate opportunities for small businesses.'0"
This thesis focuses on the opportunities for and the impediments
to small business participation in the environmental remediation serv-
ices industry.105 The federal government must introduce new contract
vehicles into the current procurement system to effectively manage
environmental site cleanup and remediation. It must also decide, in
accordance with procurement statutes, regulations, and decisions, the
practical extent of small business participation in one of this decade's
most lucrative industries.
II. SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION
Congress established the Small Business Administration (SBA) in
1953 and gave it the responsibility to administer a range of programs
designed to achieve specific economic goals.1 6 Generally, eligibility
for assistance under SBA programs requires that a firm be a certain
size, measured either by the number of employees or amount of reve-
nues.1 17 In addition, other federal agencies may implement programs
for which a small size is an eligibility criterion.'0 Both the actual set-
ting of size standards and the determination of which firms fall within
these standards to qualify as small are exclusively within the SBA's
jurisdiction. 10 9
103. The Corps has been lauded for the creation of its new contracting approach to speed
hazardous substance cleanup. Specifically, the Corps has been recognized for pioneering the
TERC, a contracting tool that incorporates cradle-to-grave environmental tasks into one con-
tract instrument. The Top News Makers of1994, ENGNEEPRNG Nnvs-REco.D, Jan. 219, 1995, at
94.
104. Id.
105. See supra text accompanying notes 16-18.






A. Regulatory Definitions of Business Size and Status
1. Small Business
The Small Business Administration defines a small business as
one that is independently owned and operated and is not dominant in
its field."' 0 According to the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), a
small business concern means a concern, ... , that is independently
owned and operated, not dominant in the field of operation' in
which it is bidding on government contracts, and qualified as a small
business under certain criteria and size standards.112 Depending on
the industry, size standard eligibility is based on the average number
of employees for the preceding twelve months, or sales volume aver-
aged over a three year period." 3 Typically, the size standard used for
small businesses involved in wholesaling or manufacturing is mea-
sured by the number of employees in the firm, while the size standard
used for small businesses engaged in construction or the provision of
services is the measure of the firm's revenues.
1 4
In order to stimulate growth and fair competition for small busi-
ness, the policy of DoD and other executive agencies is to acquire
supplies, services, and construction from small businesses. The acqui-
sition of an agency's requirement from a particular group is called a
set-aside." 5 An acquisition is reserved for exclusive small business
participation if, after review," 6 a unilateral determination by a gov-
ernment representative, known as a contracting officer, is made justi-
fying the set-aside,"17 or a joint determination is made by the Small
110. See 15 U.S.C. § 631 (1994).
111. A concern is not dominant in its field of operation when it does not exercise a control-
ling or major influence on a national basis in a kind of business activity in which a number of
business concerns are primarily engaged. See Small Business Size Standards: Environmental
Services, 58 Fed. Reg. 4074 (1993). In determining whether dominance exists, consideration
shall be given to all appropriate factors, including: volume of business; number of employees;
financial resources; competitive status or position; ownership or control of materials; processes;
patents; license agreements; facilities; sales territory; and nature of business activity. Id.
112. See FAR, 48 C.F.R. pt. 19.001.
113. See FAR, 48 C.F.R. pt. 19.101.
114. Id.
115. See FAR, 48 C.F.R. pts. 6.203(a), 19.501(a). A detailed explanation of DoD's recent
decision to suspend its small disadvantaged business set-aside program is found at footnote 131.
116. "Mhe contracting officer shall set-aside an individual acquisition or class of acquisitions
when it is determined to be in the interest of (a) Maintaining or mobilizing the Nation's full
productive capacity, (b) War or national defense programs, or (c) Assuring that a fair proportion
of Government contracts in each industry category is placed with small business onerns .... "
FAR, 48 C.F.R. pt. 19.502-1.
117. See FAR, 48 C.F.R. pt. 19.501(b), (c).
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Business Administration and the contracting officer regarding the set-
aside." 8
The contracting officer's review involves consideration of recom-
mendations made by agency personnel who are cognizant of the
agency's small and small disadvantaged business utilization pro-
grams.1" 9 Documentation must accompany a recommendation that an
acquisition is inappropriate for set-aside.'2 ° Once a product or service
has been acquired successfully by a contracting office on a small busi-
ness set-aside basis, all future requirements of that office for that par-
ticular product or service must, if required by agency regulations, be
acquired on the basis of a repetitive set-aside. 2' However, an agency
requirement need not be set-aside if the contracting officer deter-
mines there is not a reasonable expectation that: (1) offers will be ob-
tained from at least two responsible small business concerns offering
the products of different small business concerns; and (2) awards will
be made at fair market prices. 22 All solicitations involving set-asides
must specify the applicable small business size standard and product
classification."z Finally, a contract may not be awarded as a result of a
set-aside if cost to the awarding agency exceeds the fair market
price. 24
2. Small Disadvantaged Business
A small disadvantaged business concern means a small business
concern that is at least fifty-one percent unconditionally owned by one
or more individuals who are both socially"2 and economically 126 dis-
advantaged, or a publicly owned business that has at least fifty-one
percent of its stock unconditionally owned by one or more socially
118. See FAR, 48 C.F.R pt. 19.501(b).
119. See FAR, 48 C.F.R. pt. 19.501(c).
120. Id.
121. See FAR, 48 C.F.R. pt. 19.501(g).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. FAR, 48 C.F.R. pt. 19.501(i).
125. Socially disadvantaged is defined by "individuals who have been subjected to racial or
ethnic prejudice or cultural bias because of their identity as a member of a group without regard
to their qualities as individuals." FAR, 48 C.F.R. pt. 19.001.
126. Economically disadvantaged incorporates the definition of socially disadvantaged indi-
viduals "whose ability to compete in the free enterprise system is impaired due to diminished
opportunities to obtain capital and credit as compared to others in the same line of business who
are not socially disadvantaged. Individuals who certify that they are members of named groups
(Black Americans, Hispanic Americans, Native Americans, Asian-Pacific Americans, Subconti-




and economically disadvantaged individuals and that has its manage-
ment and daily business controlled by one or more such individuals.127
DoD's regulations (DFARS) defining a small disadvantaged business
are more restrictive than the FAR. 2 ' The DFARS says that a small
disadvantaged business concern means a small business concern,
owned and controlled by individuals who are both socially and eco-
nomically disadvantaged,'129 and the majority of earnings directly ac-
crue to such individuals.130
The requirements imposed by the FAR to set-aside acquisitions
for exclusive small disadvantaged business participation are the same
as the SBA's regulations. However, DoD promulgated its own regula-
tions for total set-asides to small disadvantaged businesses con-
cerns.' 3' DoD's regulations place certain restrictions on the
127. Id.
128. See DFARS, 48 C.F.R. pt. 252.219; 13 CF.R. § 124.105.
129. See DFARS, 48 C.F.R. pt. 252.219; 13 C.F.R. § 124.105.
130. See DFARS, 48 C.F.R. pt. 252.219-7000.
131. In a memorandum dated October 23, 1995, the Under Secretary of Defense informed
all major commands that, effective immediately, DoD suspended all of its SDB set-aside regula-
tions. See Danielle Conway-Jones and Christopher Leon Jones, Jr., Department of Defense Pro-
curement Practices After Adarand: What Lies Ahead for the Largest Purchaser of Goods and
Services and Its Base of Small and Disadvantaged Business Contractors, 39 How. L.J. 391 (1995).
This suspension was predicated on the June 12, 1995 decision by the Supreme Court that raised
the standard of review in cases challenging the constitutionality of federal affirmative action
programs to strict scrutiny. See id. at 393; see also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S.
200 (1995).
Adarand Constructors, Inc. (Adarand) is a highway construction company specializing in
guardrail work, primarily as a subcontractor. Conway-Jones, supra, at 394. In 1989, Mountain
Gravel and Construction Company (Mountain) was awarded a prime contract for a highway
construction project by the U.S. Department of Transportation (DoT). Id. Mountain solicited
bids from subcontractors for the guardrail portion of the project. Id. at 395. Adarand submitted
the lowest bid. Id. Gonzales Construction Company (Gonzales) also submitted a bid. Id. The
prime contract's terms gave additional compensation to Mountain for hiring subcontractors cer-
tified as SDBs. Although Adarand submitted the lowest bid, Gonzales was awarded the subcon-
tract work, because, unlike Adarand, it was certified as a SDB. Id.
Adarand challenged DoT's program which provided prime contractors with incentives to
hire SDB subcontractors. Specifically, Adarand asserted that the presumption of social and eco-
nomic disadvantage created by the Small Business Act and other federal regulations, discrimi-
nates on the basis of race in violation of the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection.
Id. at 397.
Adarand's claim was rejected by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit when that
court applied the "heightened scrutiny" standard. Id. The Court found that DoT acted within
its discretion by adhering to the congressional mandate expressed in the Small Business Act. Id.
In vacating the judgment of the Tenth Circuit, the Supreme Court held that "all racial classifica-
tions, imposed by whatever Federal, State, or local governmental actor, must be analyzed by a
reviewing court under strict scrutiny." Id. Without invalidating the specific classification in the
Small Business Act, the Supreme Court held that the Tenth Circuit used the incorrect standard
to evaluate Adarand's challenge. Id. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the lower court




application of set-asides. 132 For instance, an acquisition should not be
set-aside for small disadvantaged businesses when: the product or ser-
vice has been acquired successfully on a small business set-aside basis;
the acquisition is for construction, including maintenance and repair,
and is under $2 million, or is for dredging under $1 million; the acqui-
sition is for architect-engineer services or construction design for mili-
tary construction projects, without regard to dollar value; or the
acquisition is reserved for the 8(a) program. 33
3. Section 8(a) Program
The 8(a) program takes its name from section 8(a) of the Small
Business Act. The Act, as amended, created the 8(a) program to al-
low the Small Business Administration to assist small companies,
owned and operated by socially and economically disadvantaged per-
sons, develop their businesses. In order to participate in the 8(a) pro-
gram, a firm must apply for membership.
A significant tool for 8(a) business development is the award of
federal contracts. Under the program, the SBA acts as a prime con-
tractor and enters into various contracts, including contracts for envi-
ronmental remediation services, with other federal government
departments and agencies. 3 In its role as a prime contractor, the
SBA then awards subcontracts for the performance of those contracts
with small companies in the 8(a) program.135 The SBA's subcontrac-
tors are referred to as 8(a) contractors.
Through their cooperative efforts, the SBA and an agency match
the agency's requirements with the capabilities of 8(a) contractors to
establish a basis for the agency to contract with the SBA under the
8(a) program." 6 There are three ways in which agency requirements
become known by the SBA. The SBA can request, through a search
letter, that the agency consider the capabilities of an 8(a) contractor
After studying the Supreme Court's decision, DoD opined that its SDB program and imple-
menting regulations may be indefensible. Id. at 419. Accordingly, DoD's suspension of its regu-
lations equates to a probable loss of prime contract and subcontract opportunities for a segment
of society that historically has been excluded from DoD's procurement system. Id.; see also H.R.
REP. No. 99-332, at 140 (1985).
132. At the time of this writing, DoD had not suspended its SDB set-aside regulations. For
information only, the explanation of the SDB set-aside program will remain in this work.
133. See DFARS, 48 C.F.R. pt. 219.502-70(b).
134. See FAR, 48 C.F.R. pt. 19.800.
135. Id.
136. See FAR, 48 C.F.R. pt. 19.803.
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and identify acquisitions to support the firm's business plan. 37 The
SBA can identify a specific agency requirement for a particular 8(a)
firm and then ask the agency contracting activity to offer the acquisi-
tion to the 8(a) program. 138 Finally, agencies may review indepen-
dently their acquisitions for the purpose of identifying requirements
that may be offered to the SBA.139 Any contract resulting from these
efforts may be awarded to the SBA for performance by eligible 8(a)
firms on either a sole source or competitive basis.
1 40
4. Small Women-Owned Business
Congress found that women-owned businesses had become major
contributors to the American economy.14 ' However, despite such
progress, women as a group, remained subject to discrimination in en-
trepreneurial endeavors due to their gender. 42 Women-owned busi-
nesses are subjected to both overt and subtle forms of discrimination
which impact upon their ability to raise or secure capital, acquire man-
agerial talents, and capture market opportunities.143 Congress found
that the expeditious removal of these discriminatory barriers is essen-
tial to providing a fair opportunity for full participation in the free
enterprise system.'" In response to these findings, Congress estab-
lished the Assistance to Women Program.'45
In response to the need to aid and stimulate women's business
enterprise, the Federal Acquisition Regulation directs agencies to
take appropriate action to facilitate, preserve, and strengthen wo-
men's business enterprise, and to ensure full participation by women
in the free enterprise system.' 46 Appropriate action includes the
award of subcontracts under federal prime contracts.1 47
The Small Business Act defines a small business concern owned
and controlled by women as a small business concern which is at least
fifty-one percent owned by one or more women; or, in the case of any
publicly owned business, one in which at least fifty-one percent of the
137. See FAR, 48 C.F.R. pt. 19.803(a).
138. See FAR, 48 C.F.R. pt. 19.803(b).
139. See FAR, 48 C.F.R. pt. 19.803(c).
140. See FAR, 48 C.F.R. pt. 19.800(b).









stock is owned by one or more women and the management and daily
business operations are controlled by one or more women. 148 The
federal government's goal for participation by small business concerns
owned and controlled by women is set at not less than five percent of
the total value of all prime contract and subcontract awards for each
fiscal year.
149
B. SBA and the Federal Procurement Process
The U.S. Small Business Administration is responsible for ensur-
ing that small businesses obtain a fair share of government contracts
and subcontracts. °50 The congressional mandate of the Small Business
Act provides that the government aid, counsel, assist, and protect, in-
sofar as is possible, the interests of small businesses to ensure that a
fair proportion of the total purchases and contracts or subcontracts for
property and services for the government be placed with small busi-
nesses. 1" Amendments to the Small Business Act and current legisla-
tion have reinforced and expanded the SBA's vital mission.152 The
SBA, working closely with federal agencies and the nation's leading
contractors, carries out its procurement assistance responsibilities
through prime contracting, subcontracting, and the use of the Procure-
ment Automated Source System (PASS).
53
One of the SBA's functions is to determine the size of a business
in order to categorize that business as small and, therefore, eligible for
set-asides or preferences. The SBA establishes small business size
standards on an industry by industry basis.154 Small business size stan-
dards are applied by classifying the product or service being acquired
in the industry whose definition, as found in the Standard Industrial
148. See 15 U.S.C. § 637(d)(3)(D) (1994); 13 C.F.R. § 121.101.
149. Federal Acquisitions Streamlining Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-355,108 Stat. 3243; Con-
tinued Committment to Small, Small Disadvantaged, and Small Women-Owned Businesses in
Federal Procurement, 59 Fed. Reg. 52,397 (1994); 15 U.S.C. § 644(g) (1994).
150. See 13 C.F.R1 § 124.101.
151. See 15 U.S.C. § 631; FAR, 48 C.F.R. pt. 19.201.
152. See 15 U.S.C. § 631; FAR, 48 C.F.R. pt. 19.201.
153. The PASS system was developed to assist small businesses in their efforts to obtain a fair
share of government contract and subcontract awards. PASS utilizes information submitted by
the firms to create a computerized directory that describes the profiles of over 250,000 small
businesses, which are interested in competing for federal and private sector procurements.
Prime contractors in search of small business subcontractors are charged a nominal fee to access
the PASS.: There is no charge, however, to be listed on the database. See DERP REPORT FY94,
supra note 4.
154. See 13 C.F.R. § 121.
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Classification Manual,'15 best describes the principal nature of the
product or service being acquired, 56 identifying the size standard the
SBA established for that industry,157 and specifying the size standard
in the solicitation so that offerors can appropriately represent them-
selves as small or large.' 58 The federal regulations require small busi-
nesses, small disadvantaged businesses, and women-owned businesses
to represent their size status by written self certification.' 9 However,
in order to participate in procurements as an 8(a) contractor, the SBA
must verify the eligibility of a firm before offering membership. 6 °
In considering the appropriate size standard for an industry, the
SBA generally evaluates the structural characteristics of an industry
by analyzing at least four industry factors. 6 1 These factors include:
average firm size; start-up costs; competition; and the distribution of
firms by size.' 6 The SBA reports that, as a relatively new and devel-
oping industry, comprehensive industry data by which to build a struc-
tural analysis remains limited for the environmental remediation
services industry. 63 In order to overcome the obstacle of lack of data,
the SBA constructed its own database of environmental remediation
services firms based upon information from non-governmental
sources.
164
In constructing its database, the SBA was able to identify firms
that perform activities associated with environmental remediation
services. The SBA found that firms in nine industries, considered the
primary industries from which firms perform some or all aspects of
environmental remediation work, had to be reviewed to identify those
firms in the business of providing environmental remediation serv-
155. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BuDGET, STANDARD INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATION
MANuAL (1987) [hereinafter SIC MANUAL 1987]. The SIC Manual is intended to cover the
entire field of economic activities. It classifies and defines activities by industry categories and is
the source used by SBA as a guide in defining industries for size standards. See FAR, 48 C.F.R.
pt. 19.102(g).
156. See FAR, 48 C.F.R1 pt. 19.102(b)(1).
157. See FAR, 48 C.F.R. pt. 19.102(b)(2).
158. See FAR, 48 C.F.R. pt. 19.102(b)(3).
159. See FAR, 48 C.F.R. pt. 19.301(a)-(d); see also FAR, 48 C.F.R. pt. 19.703(a).
160. See FAR, 48 C.F.R pt. 19.802; 13 C.F. §§ 124.101-113.
161. Small Business Administration, 59 Fed. Reg. 47,236, 47238 (1994) (to be codified at 13
C.F.R. pt. 121).
162. Id.
163. Data is limited because "[t]he statistical collection agencies of the Federal government,
the primary sources of economic data on industries in the economy, do not publish data on
environmental remediation services firms since this activity has not yet been identified... [by]




ices.' 65 These industries are: Heavy Construction (SIC 1629); Wreck-
ing and Demolition Work (1795); Special Trade Contractors (1799);
Local Trucking without Storage (4212); Refuse Systems (4953); Sani-
tary Services (8711); Commercial Physical and Biological Research
(8731); and Testing Laboratories (8734).166 Volumes of data on these
firms were then combined to derive information on the structure of
the environmental remediation services industry.167
What the SBA found was that larger firms captured a greater
share of the total industry revenues in the environmental remediation
services market.1 68 The SBA concluded that its findings warranted the
establishment of a higher size standard than is generally in effect for
each of the nine industries used to construct the database representing
the environmental remediation services industry.169
This conclusion is not surprising since environmental remediation
service was introduced into the SBA's SIC system as a sub-category
that would not be assigned to a procurement unless the government's
requirements were for multi-discipline environmental remediation ac-
tivities. Federal agencies developed and awarded large, multi-disci-
pline contracts well before the SBA proposed its rules creating the
environmental remediation services sub-category. These mega, full
service contracts attracted large contractors with extensive resources
to perform the required work. Conversely, the multi-discipline aspect
of remediation contracts significantly reduced small business involve-
ment in the industry because of a small business's inability to perform
a variety of remediation functions under one contract. It is evident
that federal agencies benefit from the use of multi-discipline remedia-
tion contracts in their effort to cleanup sites quickly and cost effec-
tively. Based upon the above, it is clear that the environmental
remediation service sub-category was created to satisfy the govern-
165. Id.
166. See 59 Fed. Reg. 47,236.
167. Id. In order to perform a structural analysis of the environmental remediation services
industry to develop a size standard, the relative differences of the four industry factors were
calculated between the derived environmental remediation services industry and a comparison
industry group. See id at 39. The comparison industry group consisted of firms within the same
nine SIC codes that composed the derived industry group. See 59 Fed. Reg. 47,236. However,
the comparison industry group could not consist of firms engaged in environmental remediation
work. From the differences between the comparison industry group and the derived industry
group, a range of size standards was developed. Id.
168. Id. Based upon the relationship between the derived environmental remediation serv-
ices industry and the comparison industry, the SBA determined that larger firms composed the




ment's preference for awarding large remediation contracts. 70 The
SBA recognized, before issuing its final rule on this industry's size
standard, that federal remediation and site restoration projects were
already being designed as multi-year, multi-discipline projects with
contract cost estimates falling between $20 and $30 million, with some
contracts exceeding $100 million.'71 Thus, it appears that any analysis
by the SBA regarding this industry would have concluded with a size
standard tailored to accommodate the mega remediation contracts be-
ing awarded by the federal government. 72 In fact, the result of the
increase in the size standard for the environmental remediation serv-
ices industry is the categorization of businesses, previously considered
large, as small for purposes of performing mega, remediation contract
work.
C. Federal Acquisition Regulation and Small Business
Requirements
The United States Government is the world's largest buyer of
goods and services.173 Purchases by military and civilian installations
amount to approximately $200 billion a year.174 The government buys
an array of commodities and services, including environmental
remediation services. The public procurement of environmental
remediation services, although a new and burgeoning industry, re-
mains subject to federal procurement regulations. One of the rubrics
of federal procurement is the requirement to seek full and open com-
petition. However, DoD and other federal agencies are permitted to
facilitate certain socio-economic programs through the procurement
process.'"
According to the Federal Acquisition Regulation, by which the
federal procurement statutes are implemented, 76 there are three
levels of competition. The first level is full and open competition.'77
Under full and open competition, all responsible sources are permit-
ted to compete for government contracts. 78 The second level is full
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. See 59 Fed. Reg. 47,236.
173. See BROCKWEL HEYUN, supra note 55.
174. Id.
175. See 15 U.S.C. § 637(a).
176. Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 1175 (1984).
177. See 10 U.S.C. § 2304 (1994); 41 U.S.C. § 253 (1994); FAR, 48 C.F.R. pL 6.101(a).
178. See 10 U.S.C. § 2304; 41 U.S.C. § 253; FAR, 48 C.F.R. pt. 6.101(a).
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and open competition after exclusion of sources. 79 Under this level
of competition, agencies are required to use competitive contracting
procedures, but may restrict competition to the following: (1) small
businesses; 80 (2) firms located in labor surplus areas; 181 (3) small, dis-
advantaged businesses (SDBs);' ' and (4) SDBs that are members of
the Small Business Administration's 8(a) program. 83 The third level
is other than full and open competition. 184 Under this final level of
competition, agencies may contract without providing for full and
open competition. These contracts are often referred to as sole source
contracts.18 5
A portion of the government's environmental remediation serv-
ices requirements that are contracted out may have to be satisfied by
small businesses: In 1994, the President of the United States issued a
memorandum for the "Heads of Executive Departments and Agen-
cies" which reaffirmed the policy of the federal government that a fair
proportion of federal contracts be placed with small, small disadvan-
taged, and small women-owned businesses.186 The President also en-
visioned that small, small disadvantaged, and women-owned
businesses have the maximum practicable opportunity to participate
as subcontractors in contracts awarded by the federal government
consistent with efficient contract performance.' a7 To achieve this pol-
icy goal, the President encouraged the use of various tools, including
179. See FAR, 48 C.F.R. pt. 6.200 and pt. 6.201.
180. See FAR, 48 C.F.R. pt. 6203.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. See FAR, 48 C.F.R. pt. 6.204.
184. See 10 U.S.C. § 2304(c); 41 U.S.C. § 253(c); FAR, 48 C.F.R. pt. 6.301(a).
185. Specific authority is granted to DoD, inter alia, to contract without providing for full
and open competition. See 10 U.S.C. § 2304(c). The following statutory authorities permit sole
source contracting: (a) where there is only one responsible source and no other supplies or serv-
ices will satisfy agency requirements, see FAR, 48 C.F.R. pt. 6.302-1; (b) unusual or compelling
urgency, see FAR, 48 C.F.R. pt. 6.302-2; (c) industrial mobilization; or engineering, developmen-
tal, or research capability, see FAR, 48 C.F.R. pt. 6.302-3; (d) international agreements, see
FAR, 48 C.F.R. pt. 6.302-4; (e) authorized or required by statute, see FAR, 48 C.F.R. pt. 6.302-5;
(f) national security, see FAR, 48 C.F.R. pt. 6.302-6; or public interest, see FAR, 48 C.F.R. pt.
6.302-7.
186. Memorandum of the President, Continued Commitment to Small, Small Disadvan-
taged, and Small Women-Owned Businesses in Federal Procurement, 59 Fed. Reg. 52,397
(1994);. See 15 U.S.C. § 631 (1995); see also Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994
(FASA), Pub. L. No. 103-355, 108 Stat. 3243 (authorizing civilian agencies to utilize set-aside
procurements for small disadvantaged business). The Act, for the first time, establishes goals for
contracting with small women-owned businesses. See FASA § 7106 (Procurement Goals for
Small Business Concerns Owned by Women).
187. See FASA § 7106.
1997]
Howard Law Journal
set-asides, price preferences, and use of 8(a) contractors.18 8 Congress
also has supported the policy that the federal government use all prac-
tical means necessary, consistent with its needs and obligations, to im-
plement and coordinate all federal department, agency,
instrumentality policies, programs, and activities in order to foster the
economic development, growth, and expansion of small business. 18 9
The President has established a government-wide goal for partici-
pation by small business concerns at not less than twenty percent of
the total value of all prime contract awards for each fiscal year.190 The
government-wide goal for small disadvantaged businesses is five per-
cent. 91 Despite these goals, each federal agency must set its own goal
that presents, for that agency, the maximum practicable opportunity
for small business concerns, small disadvantaged businesses, and small
women-owned businesses."9
Federal Acquisition Regulation, Part 19,19 Small Business and
Small Disadvantaged Business Concerns, implements the acquisition
related sections of the Small Business Act, 94 the Armed Services Pro-
curement Act,195 the Federal Property and Administrative Services
Act,'96 and Executive Order 12,138.19 The FAR provides rules for
determining whether a concern is eligible for participation in small
business programs; the respective roles of executive agencies and the
Small Business Administration in implementing the programs; setting
acquisitions aside for exclusive competitive participation by small
business concerns; the rules pertaining to the Certificate of Compe-
tency program; 98 the rules for the 8(a) program; and the use of wo-
men-owned small business concerns.
188. Id.
189. See 15 U.S.C. § 631(a).
190. See 15 U.S.C. § 644(g).
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. See FAR, 48 C.F.R. pt. 19.000.
194. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 631-656.
195. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2331.
196. See 41 U.S.C. § 252.
197. Exec. Order No. 12,138, 44 Fed. Reg. 29,637 (1979), as amended by Exec. Order 12,608,
52 Fed. Reg. 34,617 (1987).
198. See infra note 382 for a brief discussion of the Certificate of Competency process.
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D. Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation and Small Business
Requirements
The Department of Defense has established its own policies and
requirements regarding participation by small businesses in its pro-
curement efforts. DoD has set a goal, the objective of which is to
award five percent of the total combined amount of contract and sub-
contract dollars to small disadvantaged business concerns 99 for each
fiscal year from 1987 through the year 2000.200 The policy supporting
this goal is to maximize the number of small disadvantaged business
concerns 201 in DoD contracting and subcontracting. 2 The DoD has
achieved its goals by awarding approximately forty percent of its con-
tract and subcontract dollars to small businesses, which includes the
attainment of the five percent goal for amounts awarded to SDBs.
20 3
Because DoD has surpassed the government-wide goal of twenty per-
cent, it does not set specific goals.
In order to achieve its five percent goal for contract and subcon-
tract awards to small disadvantaged businesses, DoD has enunciated
that it will use the 8(a) program, small disadvantaged business set-
asides, evaluation preferences, advance payments, outreach, and tech-
nical assistance programs.' 4 Unfortunately, the forty percent and five
percent goals imposed by DoD only need be accomplished by combin-
ing the contract or subcontract dollars for all industries. Therefore,
small businesses engaged in certain skill intensive industries, such as
the environmental remediation services industry, are not guaranteed
any involvement in federal procurements for that industry. Regard-
less, DoD will still be able to meet its objectives with total contract
and subcontract dollars going to other small businesses in different
industries.
III. TYPES OF ENVIRONMENTAL REMEDIATION
SERVICE CONTRACTS
The Departments of Defense and Energy are the two entities re-
sponsible for the majority of contamination of the environment by the
199. See DFARS, 48 C.F.R. pt. 219.201.
200. See DFARS, 48 C.F.R. pt. 219.000(1).
201. See supra notes 133 and 134.
202. See DFARS, 48 C.F.R. pt. 219.000(2).
203. See DERP REPORT FY94, supra note 4, at 59.
204. See DFARS, 48 C.F.R. pt. 219.201
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federal government. ° As such, these entities, along with the EPA,
are required to take the lead in implementing efficient and effective
cleanup programs to ensure that the federal government remains in
compliance with environmental laws and regulations. Since DoD and
DoE are heavily engaged in cleanup contracting, their contracting in-
struments and policies will briefly be examined to determine the exist-
ence of new or augmented opportunities for small businesses to
participate in the environmental remediation services industry.
A. Total Environmental Restoration Contracts
The use of traditional contractual instruments and standard con-
tracting procedures have proved ineffective and unwieldy in the gov-
ernment's effort to cleanup that part of the environment that it has
degraded or destroyed. According to the government, one of the ma-
jor obstacles to the successful cleanup of contamination of the envi-
ronment is the confusion created by the placement of more than one
contractor with overlapping responsibilities on the same installa-
tion.20 6 Such an overlap in contractor work forces is thought to render
project management, contract administration, and cost control ex-
tremely inefficient and expensive.20 7 In response to the void in effec-
tive contracting instruments, the Corps instituted the Total
Environmental Restoration Contract (TERC) approach to environ-
mental remediation.0 8 The TERC functions as an alternative acquisi-
tion method, to be used when it is deemed more prudent and in the
government's interest to have a single contractor coordinate and ac-
complish all aspects of remediation on selected large, complex sites.
Environmental cleanup work is very costly to complete and can
be even more costly if the wrong contracting approach is used. 0 9 Site
characterization and the selection of the correct remediation process
are critical elements affecting the determination of the appropriate
contracting approach.210 However, site characterizations, at a certain
point, must be abandoned when they become too expensive to com-
plete and produce little or no benefit.21' It is at this point where con-
tractor accountability and responsibility become paramount.
205. See DERP REPORT FY94, supra note 4.





211. See TERC AcQuisrnoN PLAN, supra note 12.
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Implementation of the most feasible remediation process then be-
comes the only means of progressing toward the commencement of a
cleanup project. Therefore, it is imperative that flexible contracting
tools are in place and available when considering the acquisition strat-
egy that must be used at a given site.
The Corps has considered the various contracting methods, strat-
egies, and approaches currently in use by the EPA, the Navy, the Air
Force Center for Environmental Excellence and others, and has con-
cluded that the TERC approach to contracting for environmental
remediation services at large, complex sites is the most effective pro-
curement method to accomplish cleanups.212 The Corps believes that
the TERC approach will bring the government more in line with the
way private industry accomplishes environmental cleanup projects.
213
The advantages of the TERC approach to remediation con-
tracting, as expressed by the Corps, include the clear identification of
the responsible contractor, more effective control by the contractor
over the work it is responsible for completing, faster resolution of
problems encountered on the site, more effective management and in-
terface between contractors (primes and their subcontractors) in
scheduling and completing work, and faster and more fluid operation
on site.214 The Corps posits that the TERC method drives a project to
faster completion, saves time and money, and provides reasonable
profit for primes and subcontractors. 1 5
B. Department of Energy Environmental Remediation
Contracts
216
The Department of Energy has statutory responsibility for activi-
ties connected with the major program areas of Defense Programs,
212. Id.
213. Id. The Corps' viewpoint appears to be in direct contravention of the viewpoint of small
businesses and their trade representatives. Small businesses perceive that their skills are more
fully utilized by the private sector in smaller remediation contracts than by the government in its
administration of the HTRW program and, in particular, large bundled TERC contracts. See
infra Part VI.A.
214. See TERC AcoUIsmoN PLAN, supra note 12.
215. Id.
216. The Department of Energy's Environmental Restoration Managements Contractor
contracts are similar to the Corps' TERC contracts, which are used by DoD and most agencies
when cleaning up a contaminated site or installation. DoE's total remediation contract is briefly
discussed, because DoE has chosen to use its own contracting activities to procure remediation




Nuclear Energy, and Energy Research.217 To carry out its responsibil-
ities in these areas, DoE operates a large industrial complex located at
various production, processing, testing, and research and development
installations across the country.218 This complex has generated and
will continue to generate quantities of radioactive, hazardous, and
mixed wastes that must be managed, cleaned up, and disposed of.
21 9
The Department's policy regarding these matters is to conduct its op-
erations in full compliance with applicable federal, state, local health
and safety, and environmental statutes.220
Environmental restoration is concerned with the assessment and
cleanup of facilities and sites that are no longer part of active opera-
tions. In response to its need to effectively and efficiently cleanup
sites and disprove the perception that its contractors have become
part of the cleanup problem, DoE has implemented the Environmen-
tal Restoration Management Contractor (ERMC) approach for clean-
ing up the nation's nuclear weapons complex. 221 According to DoE,
ERMC calls for a management contractor, experienced in environ-
mental restoration, to focus solely on the environmental restoration of
a site, subcontracting out all but the management and oversight of the
cleanup.=2
The Department has made the ERMC approach a central ele-
ment in its environmental restoration plans.'m The ERMC would be
responsible for targeting more contractors with cleanup expertise, in
accordance with RCRA and CERCLA, and making these contractors
accessible to DoE.2 24 The ERMC would be responsible for improving
management control of the environmental restoration program, re-
217. See U.S. DEPARTmENT oF ENERGY, ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION AND WASTE MAN-
AGEMENT FwvE YEAR PLAN 80 (1993). Agency responsibility for other agency programs is not






222. U.S. General Accounting Office, DOE Management: Implementing the Environmental
Restoration Management Contractor Concept, Testimony to the Subcomm. on Oversight and In-
vestigations of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, GAO Testimony Rep. No. RCED-
94-86 (Dec. 1, 1993) (testimony by Victor S. Rezendes, Director, Energy and Science Issues,
Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division, Department of Energy). DoE
concentrates its cleanup efforts on its own nuclear installations. Therefore, DoE may not look to
the Corps to perform large remediation work. Rather, agencies, like DoE, may coordinate with
the Corps if a TERC contract is already in place at a nearby installation, and the required





ducing cleanup costs, and facilitating more timely restoration of
sites.m
C. Background of Total Environmental Restoration Contracts-
Cradle to Grave Environmental Contract
Total Environmental Restoration Contracts call for the imple-
mentation of a number of indefinite-delivery type, remediation con-
tracts that allow a single contractor to provide total remediation for a
selected installation from the initial study phase through short term
operation and maintenance.226 Total Environmental Restoration
Contracts are issued as Indefinite-Delivery/Indefinite-Quantity con-
tracts.2 7 The basic contracts contain all of the clauses applicable to
A-E, service, and construction type ID/IQ contracts.'
The scope of work in TERC contracts requires that the contrac-
tor accomplish all pre-design, design, and remediation tasks on a spec-
ified or non-specified installation.229 The projected maximum dollar
value of a TERC is $200 million, but will vary in each contract.230 The
contract performance period for TERC contracts runs from four years
with two additional three year options for a possible contract period
of ten years.3 Any size contractor fortunate enough to obtain a
TERC contract will likely gain greater experience and expertise in
the area of remediation, making that contractor realize reasonable
profit as well as securing a position as a future prospect for additional
federal remediation work.
225. Id. The ERMC contract is very similar to the TERC. However, minor differences exist
with regard to the degree of involvement of the agency in the administration of the contract. For
instance, DoE tends to rely on its ERMC contractors for administration and management of all
aspects of environmental restoration. Id. Cf. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, DRAFT CON-
TRAcr FOR INTEGRATED TEAM MANAGEMENT OF TE SAVANNAH RrivE Srr (June 1995) (on
file with author). The Corps plays a greater role in the management and administration of its
entire restoration program. See TERC AcotusmoN PLA4,N, supra note 12.
226. See TERC AcoUISrrON PLAN, supra note 12.
227. See supra note 98.
228. See TERC AcouismorN PLAN, supra note 12.
229. Id.
230. Id. For example, on August 25, 1995, the U.S. Army Engineer District, Baltimore
awarded a $330 million dollar TERC to ICF Kaiser with Picatinny Arsenal as the anchor instal-
lation and Aberdeen Proving Ground as a specified site. See Brian K. Peckins, Information
Paper, Total Environmental Restoration Contracts (TERC) (Jan. 16, 1996) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with author).
231. See TERC AcauisrxoN PLAN, supra note 12.
1997]
Howard Law Journal
1. Multi-Year TERC and The Competition in Contracting Act
Contracting methods must be tailored to a project's require-
ments, be innovative when needed, but most important, be legally
sound at all times. The Corps contends that TERCs do not replace
existing contracting tools because not every environmental cleanup
project is appropriate for TERC, and no one method is appropriate in
all circumstances. 2 Rather, the Corps states that TERCs are used to
complete actual remediation, starting at any stage of the investigation
and/or remediation process, provided funds are available, and the per-
formance and cost of work accomplished by the TERC is accepta-
ble. 33 The Corps states that TERCs are designed to complement
existing contracting tools and comply with the Competition in Con-
tracting Act (CICA).2 -' Specifically, the Corps posits that TERCs do
not unduly limit competition in violation of CICA, because the total
package approach of the TERC is necessary to satisfy the minimum
needs of the agency.235
As stated above, TERC contracts can have a performance period
of ten years. A ten-year contract, in and of itself, is not illegal. How-
ever, there are a number of factors to consider when determining the
appropriate contract term. In the case of services, the total of the ba-
sic and option periods of a contract shall not exceed five years, unless
approved in accordance with agency procedures. 6 This is a regula-
tory limitation regarding the use of options imposed by the FAR.
With agency approval, the performance period of a contract can
extend beyond five years.37 The Service Contract Act (SCA)" 8 also
imposes a five year limit on a contract's duration.239 The TERC, be-
cause of the services required, is subject to the Service Contract Act.
Because of the Service Contract Act limitation, TERC contracts were
given a base of four years, not five years, with the ten years made up
by the addition of two, three year, options. CICA is not violated by
the exercise of the three year option because all prospective offerors
are on notice of the duration of the TERC contract performance pe-
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. See TERC AcQTismoN PAN, supra note 12; see also 41 U.S.C. §§ 253, 253a-.
235. See infra Parts II.C.2.-3. for a discussion of bundled or total package requirements and
their treatment in light of CICA's requirement for full and open competition.
236. See FAR, 48 C.F.R. pt. 17.204(e).
237. Id.
238. See 41 U.S.C. § 353(d).
239. See FAR, 48 C.F.R. pt. 17.204(e).
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nod. Although the SCA limits service contracts to a period of five
years, the TERC approach is not violative of the Act, because the
extension of a contract through the exercise of option years creates a
"new" contract for purposes of the SCA.240
2. The Total Environmental Remediation Contract's Bundling
Mechanism Can Unduly Restrict Competition
Small businesses are losing opportunities to perform federal envi-
ronmental remediation work because of the bundling of federal con-
tract requirements into one package. The Corps' TERC contracts and
DoE's ERMC contracts are just two examples of contract bundling.
Contract bundling directly affects the level of competition received by
the government, because only a few sources can successfully satisfy
the requirements of these, too often, large and complex contracts.
Contract bundling of environmental remediation services has the
effect of restricting competition to large multi-discipline environmen-
tal remediation service firms. As such, bundling of these environmen-
tal remediation requirements may be a violation of CICA and
relevant FAR provisions, if TERC contracts are unduly restrictive of
competition. Presently, the bundling or "total package" mechanism of
TERC contracts has not been challenged by small businesses or other
entities not possessing the financial resources to perform multi-disci-
pline remediation. Total environmental restoration contracts have not
been the subject of challenges because otherwise interested parties
have, to date, acquiesced that they are not in a position to protest the
restrictive nature of these contracts. Unfortunately, those contractors
who do protest the bundling of contract requirements find themselves
fighting an uphill, and almost impossible, battle against the reasona-
bleness of agency action standard.241
In CardioMetrix,242 a small business concern protested the deci-
sion of the United States Coast Guard to consolidate its requirements
for clinical laboratory services at twenty-one Coast Guard clinics
throughout the east coast. Under the consolidated solicitation, the
successful contractor was required to retrieve specimens from the
240. See 29 C.F.R. § 4.143(b).
241. See DANIEL DAVID PANOBURN, CoNTRAcr BUNDLING AND VARIABLE QUANrIY
ComRAcis: THEIR Airacr oN CoMrPErrnoN AND ThE SMALL BUSINESS CONC RN (1995)
[hereinafter CoNmTAcr BUNDLING] for a complete discussion of contract bundling of federal
requirements.
242. CardioMetrix, B-244837.2, 93-2 CPD J 64 (1993).
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twenty-one clinics previously operated and managed as separate, in-
dependent sites. The protester alleged that by consolidating the re-
quirements of the twenty-one separate clinics, the Coast Guard
effectively eliminated the possibility of competition from small busi-
ness firms. The Coast Guard proffered that the decision to use a sin-
gle regional contractor was based on the agency's past and present
experience using smaller, multiple contracts that produced higher test
prices due to low quantities, divergence in test methodology, and nu-
merous billing problems resulting in interest payments and costly con-
tract administration. 43
Before deciding the protest, the Comptroller General stated:
The Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 generally requires that
solicitations include specifications which permit full and open com-
petition and contain restrictive provisions and conditions only to the
extent necessary to satisfy the needs of the agency .... Procure-
ments by an agency on a total package basis can restrict competi-
tion; however, the use of such an approach is proper where required
to satisfy the agency's minimum needs .... '
In deciding against the protester, the Comptroller General held
that past procurement difficulties from multiple procurements could
reasonably substantiate the need for a single contract provider. Thus,
the Comptroller General found that the Coast Guard's justifications
for consolidating its requirements were adequately documented, rea-
sonable, and necessary to meet its minimum requirements. Cardi-
oMetrix is an example of an agency defining its minimum needs in
such complex and broad terms so as to eliminate the possibility of
competition by small businesses. Similarly, TERC contracts are pro-
cured on a total package, large scale basis, rendering the possibility of
small business participation in remediation work remote.245
The confusion that currently surrounds the practice of contract
bundling and the difficulty in collecting data on its use result in large
part from the lack of a single, agreed upon definition.246 Three sepa-
rate laws provide different definitions of contract bundling. The first
243. The Comptroller General did not discuss whether the problems encountered by the
Coast Guard could have, been avoided or rectified by providing defined performance require-
ments. For example, the Coast Guard was concerned with divergence in test methodology. Con-
ceivably, if the Coast Guard determined the most advantageous test methodology, it could have
included the chosen methodology in its specifications.
244. CardioMetrix, 93-2 CPD 1 64, at 2.
245. See CoNTRAcr BuNDLiNG , supra note 241.
246. U.S. General Accounting Office, DoD Contracting: Extent and Impact of Contract Bun-
dling Is Unknown, REP. To CONrG., GAO Rep. No. NSIAD-94-137 (Apr. 1994).
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law requires agencies to take specific action to document the bundling
of its requirements, and its definition was incorporated into the
FAR.247 The other two laws require studies of bundling, but each uses
a different definition to explain what should be studied. 248 The SBA
has also developed its own definition to characterize contract bun-
dling.249 Small businesses may find that challenging three sets of laws
defining contract bundling may drain the resources they could use to
compete for remediation contracts in the future.
It is no secret that the federal government markedly benefits
from bundling environmental remediation requirements into one ac-
quisition.2-5 Contract bundling allows the federal government to
247. FAR, 48 C.F.R. pt. 19.202-1, Encouraging Small Business Participation in Acquisitions,
states in pertinent part:
[n the event that it is not in the interest of the federal government to afford small
usinesses equitable opportunities to compete for all contracts], [w]hen applicable, the
contracting officer shall take the following actions:
(e)(1) Provide a copy of the proposed acquisition package to the SBA procurement
center representative at least 30 days prior to the issuance of the solicitation if-
(i) The proposed acquisition is for supplies or services currently being provided
by a small business and the proposed acquisition is of a quantity or esti-
mated dollar value, the magnitude of which makes it unlikely that small
businesses can compete for the prime contract, or
(ii) The proposed acquisition is for construction and seeks to package or consol-
idate discrete construction projects and the magnitude of this consolidation
makes it unlikely that small businesses can compete for the prime
contract....
See Pub. L. No. 101-574, § 208 (1990).
248. For example, Public Law No. 102-366 defines bundling as follows:
jtjjhe term contract bundling or bundling of contract requirements refers to the prac-
tice of consolidating into a single large contract solicitation multiple procurement re-
quirements that were previously solicited and awarded as separate smaller contracts,
generally resulting in a contract opportunity unsuitable for award to a small business
concern due to the diversity and size of the elements of performance specified and the
aggregate dollar value of the anticipated award.
Pub. L. No. 102-366, § 321 (1992).
In addition, Public Law No. 103-160 defines contract bundling as follows:
[Tihe term contract bundling and bundling of contract requirements means the practice
of consolidating two or more procurement requirements of the type that were previ-
ously solicited and awarded as separate smaller contracts into a single large contract
solicitation likely to be unsuitable for award to a small business concern due to-
(1) the diversity and size of the elements of performance specified;
(2) the aggregate dollar value of the anticipated award;
(3) the geographical dispersion of the contract performance sites; or
(4) any combination of the factors described in [the above listed paragraphs].
See Pub. L. No. 103-160, § 847 (1993).
249. SBA's definition of contract bundling reads as follows:
Bundling is the consolidation of two or more requirements, descriptions, specifications,
line items or statements of work, which individually were or could be performed by
small business; resulting in a contract opportunity for supplies, services, or construction
which may be unsuitable for award to a small business concern due to the diversity and
size of the performance elements, and/or the aggregate dollar value of the anticipated
award, andor the geographical dispersion of the contract performance sites.
See SBA Procedural Notice, Control No. 6000-582 (Jul. 9, 1993).
250. The Environmental Remediation Services SIC code 8744 is not to be assigned to a pro-
curement unless that procurement is composed of three or more distinct industries identified
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achieve efficiencies in contract formation and administration and
economies of scale. Contract bundling provides agencies the opportu-
nity to procure an array of environmental remediation requirements
in a single acquisition. In addition, indefinite-delivery contracts allow
agencies to order their bundled requirements on a repetitive basis.
Conversely, contract bundling is detrimental to the viability of
small businesses seeking growth in the environmental remediation
services industry. Small businesses and their advocates believe that
contract bundling is detrimental to the small business's ability to com-
pete for prime contract awards, because these contracts require widely
varied expertise and financial resources that small businesses often
lack.251
For example, in Airport Markings of America, Inc., 2 four protes-
ters challenged the Air Force's issuance of four solicitations for rubber
and paint removal and restriping at various airfields. Each of the four
solicitations required prospective contractors to perform work at no
less than sixteen airfields. The protesters, all of whom were small
businesses, stated that the Air Force, by consolidating the rubber and
paint removal and the restriping, and by procuring the consolidated
requirements in large regional packages, precluded effective competi-
tion. In addition, the protesters asserted that small businesses are un-
able to make the large capital investment required to purchase the
necessary additional equipment or obtain bonds, and cannot subcon-
tract or enter into joint ventures on a cost-effective basis.
Furthermore, the protesters claimed that the bundling mecha-
nism employed by the Air Force unfairly favored larger companies
that, in the past, have performed regional requirements like those
found in the subject solicitations. Finally, the protesters urged that
using a total package approach to structure the solicitation would cost
the agency more money because of reduced competition, and would
result in airfields being closed for longer periods of time.
with separate SIC four digit industry codes, none of which constitute fifty percent or more of the
contract value. This limitation on the use of SIC code 8744 demonstrates that at least three
functions, which may be distinctly unrelated for classification purposes, are bundled together for
the benefit of providing the government a one stop shopping mechanism to cleanup contami-
nated sites.
251. See SBA Hears Small Business Concerns, DEF. CLEANUP, Oct. 21, 1994, at 41.
252. Airport Markings of America, Inc., B-238490; B-238490.2; B-238490.3; B-238491; B-




The Air Force argued that combining the removal and restriping
was necessary, because the prior method of managing the two require-
ments separately resulted in airfields being closed for extended peri-
ods of time or closed on short notice. According to the Air Force,
coordinating individual removal contract schedules with regional
striping schedules to ensure that airfields were left unmarked for the
shortest duration was both time consuming and costly. Finally, the
Air Force stated that there existed at least five firms able and willing
to compete for the consolidated contracts.
The Comptroller General, in sustaining in part the protest, stated
that the Air Force provided no justification for its decision to aggre-
gate eighty-four airfields under four contracts. Specifically, the
Comptroller General held that the question is not whether potential
competitors can surmount barriers to competition; but rather, whether
the barriers themselves are required to meet the government's mini-
mum needs. The Comptroller General cautioned that CICA requires
that the agency obtain full and open competition, defined as meaning
that all responsible sources are permitted to submit sealed bids or
competitive proposals; therefore, even though several offerors have
responded to one solicitation, this does not negate the fact that other
responsible sources could have been excluded, without justification, in
violation of CICA. The protesters prevailed, because the Air Force
failed to demonstrate that a single award for each of the four regions
met some rational need or served any purpose other than possibly
facilitating the administration of the contracts.
Accordingly, in Airport Markings of America, Inc., the Comptrol-
ler General implicitly recognized that bundling contract requirements,
without the proper justifications, can impede competition and effec-
tively destroy small business participation by otherwise excluding
these responsible firms from competition. 53 The negative results of
contract bundling are the same when solicitations for environmental
remediation services are issued as large, multi-discipline requirements.
The result is the wholesale exclusion of small businesses from the en-
253. See Allfast Fastening Systems, Inc., B-251315, 93-1 CPD 266 (1993); National Cus-
tomer Engineering, B-251135, 93-1 CPD 225 (1993) (holding that a solicitation requirement
that both hardware and software maintenance services be provided by the same contractor un-
duly restricts competition where the record does not provide a reasonable basis for the determi-
nation that the combined requirement reflects the agency's minimum needs).
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vironmental remediation services industry as prime contractors for
lengthy periods of time." 4
Small businesses are not alone in their concern regarding contract
bundling. For many years, Congress expressed concern about the ex-
tent and impact of consolidating or bundling requirements into large
acquisitions that diminish small business or small disadvantaged busi-
ness opportunities to participate in federal procurements. 5 This con-
cern resulted in an amendment to the Small Business Act to review all
proposed bundled acquisitions for goods or services that small busi-
nesses were currently providing, but that may be unlikely for award to
a small business.5 6
The current FAR provisions require contracting officers to iden-
tify bundled acquisitions and prepare written explanations of why
bundling is necessary5 7 The SBA must also review the contract ac-
tion . 8 However, as is evident from the issuance of TERC and
ERMC contracts, determining the propriety of bundling contract re-
quirements to restore the environment takes a back seat to achieving
a perceived speedy cleanup of contaminated sites. This view is sup-
ported by the Comptroller General's decision in A&C Building and
Industrial Maintenance Corp,259 where he stated:
[T]he possibility of obtaining economies of scale or avoiding un-
necessary duplications of costs may justify [procurements on a total
package or consolidated basis]. The decision whether to procure by
means of a total package or consolidated approach, or to break out
divisible portions of the total requirement for separate procurements,
is a matter generally within the discretion of the contracting agency,
and we will not disturb the exercise of that discretion absent a show-
ing that the agency's determination lacks a reasonable basis.260
In this regard, it is apparent that the concept of contract bundling
is at odds with the federal government's socio-economic policies be-
cause of the adverse effect that contract bundling has on small busi-
ness participation in federal procurements. The FAR directs
254. Small businesses can be excluded from serving as prime contractors on environmental
remediation contracts for up to ten years, because agencies, like DoD and DoE, have approved
multi-year remediation contracts for this length of time.
255. See DoD Contracting: Extent and Impact of Contract Bundling Is Unknown, supra note
246.
256. See Small Business Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-574, 104 Stat. 2814.
257. See FAR, 48 C.F.R. pt. 19.202-1(e)(2)(i).
258. FAR, 48 C.F.R. pt. 19.202-1(e)(4).
259. A&C Building and Industrial Maintenance Corp., B-230839, 88-2 CPD 67 (1988).
260. Id. at 2.
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contracting officers to provide small businesses with an equal opportu-
nity to compete for all contracts they can perform, consistent with the
government's interests.261 However, when contracting officers deter-
mine that bundling is in the government's interest,262 the FAR estab-
lishes an explanation and review process that can be used to justify
contract bundling.263
Choosing the government's socio-economic goals over the gov-
ernment's best interest in procuring goods and services at reasonable
prices, or vice versa, would result in extreme unfairness or profound
inefficiencies in the government's conduct of environmental remedia-
tion. Therefore, a compromise must be struck. As recommended by
the Corps, TERC contracts must be used only in those instances
where site cleanup is extremely complex and covers an extensive por-
tion of land.26 In addition, TERC contracts must provide for signifi-
cant involvement by small business.
265
These contracts do contain minimum goals for utilization of small
businesses as subcontractors. In addition to maintaining subcontract-
ing goals for defense procurement, it is the author's opinion that DoD
should maintain separate, enumerated goals for federal environmental
remediation and restoration contracts because of the very market uni-
queness of the industry.2 " Specifically, DoD and other federal agen-
cies should establish subcontracting goals independent of those goals
set for more traditional industries. Moreover, bundled contracts
should receive special review by DoD and the SBA to routinely moni-
tor the effectiveness and the future necessity for this type of contract
tool, presently issued only on an unrestricted basis.
261. See FAR § 19.202.
262. See Border Maintenance Service, Inc., B-260954; B-260954.2, 95-1 CPD % 287 (1995)
(determining that the agency properly bundled requirements for building maintenance services
at separate facilities in four cities into total package commercial facilities management procure-
ment-notwithstanding the agency's previous practice of awarding separate contracts for custo-
dial services and for maintenance services-where the agency's overall needs can be met most
effectively by awarding one contract that shifts the responsibility for managing these facilities to
the contractor).
263. Id.
264. See TERC AcQuismoN PLAN, supra note 12.
265. See infra text accompanying note 320-23 (explaining that the Corps has a subcontracting
goal of 40 percent small business participation in its TERC contracts and an eight percent goal
for SDB participation).
266. DoD and SBA should take the lead with regard to establishing separate goals for small
business involvement in remediation efforts. DoD, for example, has an interest in satisfying its
remediation requirements and increasing the industrial base of remediation contractors. The
SBA would promote its interests by creating greater opportunities for small business participa-
tion in a lucrative defense industry.
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3. TERCs' Suitability for Small Business Set-Asides
The Corps of Engineers along with the Small Business Adminis-
tration have determined that TERC contracts are not suitable for set-
asides to small and small disadvantaged businesses because of the size,
complexity, liability, cash flow, capital investment and capability is-
sues attendant with these firms.267 Notwithstanding the above, the
Corps of Engineers continues to maintain its policy, as discussed be-
low, that these firms will receive special consideration under the
TERC process.268
Traditional approaches to enhance small and small disadvantaged
business participation in the environmental remediation services in-
dustry have been unsuccessful.2 6 9 The track record for involving small
and small disadvantaged business in this industry has been sluggish
because of liability issues, specialized training and expertise require-
ments, and the complexities and uncertainties of environmental
cleanup work.270 Even more devastating to small and small disadvan-
taged businesses is the lack of incentive that prime contractors have to
involve these firms in the remediation process in a material and mean-
ingful way. This lack of incentive does not at all comport with the
procurement goals and practices of the federal government, which are
to foster increased competition and develop larger markets for the
services required by the federal government. Because determinations
have been made by the Corps of Engineers and the SBA that tradi-
tional small and small disadvantaged business programs are less than
successful in the environmental remediation services industry, new
and innovative approaches must be developed that will have the result
of significantly including these firms in the cleanup and remediation
markets.
IV. ONGOING DEVELOPMENT OF SMALL BUSINESSES IN
THE ENVIRONMENTAL REMEDIATION SERVICE
INDUSTRY
For many small, small disadvantaged, and small women-owned
businesses, environmental cleanup contracts at federal facilities might
initially seem out of reach. However, the Departments of Defense
267. See TERC AcQUISMON PLAN, supra note 12.
268. Id.; see also infra Part IV.C. for the Corps' response on achieving smal business partici-
pation in remediation contracting.




and Energy, among others, offer a host of ways small firms can enter
and prosper in the lucrative federal facilities environmental remedia-
tion market.27 ' In fact, small and small disadvantaged businesses now
hold a competitive advantage of sorts for some types of contracts, as
federal agencies have or are in the process of implementing programs
to link them with large companies that traditionally win the large facil-
ity restoration pacts.272 While the specifics differ between military
branches and federal agencies, recent cleanup contracts have required
prime contractors to either allocate a fixed percentage of the award to
small businesses or small disadvantaged businesses, or prove to the
government that such an allocation is not feasible.273
A. Mentor-Prot6g6 Program
In 1990, Congress mandated the Pilot Mentor-Prot6g6 Pro-
gram. 4 The purpose of the program is to provide incentives for
prime contractors to increase small disadvantaged business participa-
tion in DoD subcontracting. 275 The primary goal of the program is to
foster the business development of small disadvantaged businesses
(SDBs) so as to increase the capabilities of these firms to participate
as subcontractors and suppliers in DoD contracts, other government
contracts, and commercial contracts.276
The program authorizes the formation of mentoring relationships
between major prime contractors and subcontractors, who are ap-
proved by DoD as mentor firms.27 7 In order to be approved as a men-
tor, a company must be performing under at least one active
subcontracting plan negotiated pursuant to FAR Part 19.7. Compa-
nies interested in becoming mentors are exclusively responsible for
the selection of SDBs as prot6g6s.278
271. See DOE and DoD Offer Host of Options to Small and Disadvantaged Firms, 6 REP. ON
DEF. PLANTr WAsms, Oct. 10, 1994. The Pilot Mentor-Protdg6 Program was established by Pub.
L. No. 101-510, §§ 831-834, 104 Stat. 1607 (1990). The policy and procedures governing the





275. U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Contracting: Implementation of the Pilot Men-
tor-Protdgd Program, REp. To CoNO., GAO Rep. No. NSIAD-94-101 (Feb. 1994).
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. See Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) Pilot Men-
tor-Protdgd Progrm, 60 Fed. Reg. 20,079 (1995).
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Once a mentor is approved, it will choose an SDB or several
SDBs as prot6g6s. Small disadvantaged businesses selected as pro-
t6g6s by the mentor must meet the eligibility criteria with respect to
size and disadvantaged status set forth in the DoD policy. Mentor and
prot6g6(s) work together to establish a tailor made developmental
assistance program that meets both the needs of the mentor and those
of the prot6g6. After establishing the guidelines of the relationship,
the mentor-prot6g6 team submits an agreement to DoD. The Depart-
ment then reviews the mentor-prot6g6 agreement for compliance with
statutory and regulatory requirements. 279
. The mentor-prot6g6 program authorizes myriad degrees of assist-
ance from the mentor to the prot6g6. For example, a mentor firm may
provide assistance with the development of general business manage-
ment skills, financial and personnel management training, marketing,
and/or proposal preparation assistance." ° Mentor firms may also ex-
pand their involvement with prot6g6s by providing loans and limited
capital investment to assist a prot6g6 in meeting working capital re-
quirements."' Additionally, a mentor is authorized to award subcon-
tracts to its prot6g6s on a noncompetitive basis.'
A mentor contractor may have multiple prot6g6s. However,
funds are not available to provide the mentor contractor with addi-
tional incentives for additional prot6g6s that it decides to assist, de-
spite Congress' support of this program with the appropriation of $120
million-$30 million in fiscal year 1992 and $45 million in fiscal years
1993 and 1994.283 In addition, the current rules of the pilot program
allow a disadvantaged business to have only one mentor. These fund-
ing and program limitations have stirred much debate, because the
effect of the rule is to substantially reduce the number of small disad-
vantaged businesses involved in the early stages of the program.
The mentor-prot6g6 program provides incentives in the form of
direct cash reimbursement,284 credit toward SDB subcontracting





284. A mentor firm may be reimbursed only for the cost of developmental assistance in-
curred by the mentor firm and provided to a protdg6 firm pursuant to an approved mentor-
protdgA agreement and the following:
Assistance by mentor firm personnel in- (i) General business management, including
organizational management, financial management, and personnel management, mar-
keting, business development, and overall business planning; (ii) Engineering and tech-
nical matters such as production inventory control, quality assurance; and (iii) Any
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goals,2 5 or a combination of both, or authority to charge these costs
as allowable indirect costs,286 with an option to credit any un-
reimbursed costs against established subcontracting goals, ultimately
to encourage a mentor to provide developmental assistance to its pro-
t6g6s.2 According to the Defense Contract Audit Agency, although
the law does not allow the use of mentor-prot6g6 agreements as a
selection factor in awarding contracts, selection might still be influ-
enced by the existence of the agreements, insofar as evaluation factors
can include the degree of participation in the procurement by small
disadvantaged businesses as subcontractors. 8
Because implementation of the mentor-prot6g6 program has
been slow, sufficient information is not available to determine
whether the program's purposes are being achieved. 28 9 However, the
addition of this program to existing DoD sponsored resources for con-
tract opportunities to SDBs may result in increased business for small
firm contractors seeking entry into the environmental remediation
services industry.
other assistance designed to develop the capabilities of the protdg6 firm under the de-
velopmental program. (2) Award of subcontracts under DoD contracts or other con-
tracts on a noncompetitive basis. (3) Payment of progress payments for the
performance of subcontracts by a prot~g6 firm in amounts as provided for in the sub-
contract; but in no event may any such progress payment exceed 100 percent of the
costs incurred by the protdg6 firm for the performance of the subcontract. ... (4)
Advance payments under such subcontracts.... (5) Loans. (6) Investment(s) in the
protdgd firm in exchange for an ownership interest in the protdg6 firm, not to exceed 10
percent of the total ownership interest. Investments may include but not be limited to
cash, stock, contributions in kind, etc. (7) Assistance obtained by the mentor firm for
the prot~gd from ... [the] Small Business Development Centers (SBDCs) established
pursuant to ... the Small Business Act .... [e]ntities providing procurement technical
assistance [(PTAC) pursuant to the Small Business Act], Historically Black Colleges
and Universities, [and] Minority institutions of higher education.
DFARS, 48 C.F.R. App. I-107(f)(1)-(7).
285. Credit to SDB subcontracting goals is available to mentor firms that are not reimbursed
for developmental assistance costs incurred on behalf of a protdg6 firm. See DFARS, 48 C.F.R.
pt. 219.71, App. 1-109(a) and (b). The amount of credit a mentor firm may receive for such
unreimbursed developmental assistance costs are equal to: four times the total amount of such
costs attributable to assistance provided by SBDCs, HBCUs, MIs, and PTACs; three times the
total amount of such costs attributable to assistance furnished by the mentor's employees; and
two times the total amount of other such costs incurred by the mentor in carrying out the devel-
opmental assistance. DFARS, 48 C.F.R. App. I-109(d)(1)-(3).
286. Costs reimbursed via inclusion in indirect expense pools may be reimbursed only to the
extent that they are otherwise reasonable, allocable, and allowable. DFARS, 48 C.F.R. App. I-
108(b).
287. Id.
288. Bob Dornan, Mentor-Prot ge. Program Offers Chances to Few; Defense Department Pro-




B. Private Enterprise Teaming, Pooling, and Consortia
Arrangements
In addition to federal contracts set aside for small businesses and
small disadvantaged businesses, both DoE and DoD require their
contractors to allocate specific percentages of their subcontracts to
such firms. Federal agencies also encourage teaming290 of different
sized firms to compete for complex jobs and to promote mentor-pro-
trg6 relationships between such firms.
291
The SBA has developed guidance on business pooling agree-
ments which would allow groups of smaller companies to compete to-
gether against larger companies for federal procurements without: (1)
losing their small business or small disadvantaged business status or
(2) having the size standard waived in the face of such arrange-
ments.2" With pooling agreements, small businesses would be al-
lowed to form a conglomerate of sorts in order to compete, on an
unrestricted basis, with large businesses for the large environmental
remediation contracts.
The inception of a small business voluntary assistance program
sponsored by large private contractors, who are in turn rewarded in
some fashion by the federal government, is a relatively new idea con-
ceived to increase involvement of small businesses in nontraditional
federal procurements. However, assistance is one thing, actual per-
formance of complex work is another. In order for small businesses to
begin to see significant involvement in the environmental remediation
services industry, they must be given an opportunity implement the
skills acquired from large mentor contractors.
The most logical next step for small businesses that have either
participated in some form of mentor-prot6g6 arrangement or possess
remediation experience, despite the lack of any formal assistance, is to
seek out contractors, small or large, to comprise a team to compete
290. FAR, 48 C.F.R. pt. 9.601 states that a contractor team arrangement means an arrange-
ment in which-
(a) Two or more companies form a partnership or joint venture to act as a potential
prime contractor; or
(b) A potential prime contractor agrees with one or more other companies to have
them act as its subcontractors under a specified Government contract or acquisi-
tion program.
291. Id.; see also FAR, 48 C.F.R. pt. 9.602(b) (stating that "[c]ontractor team arrangements
may be appropriate particularly in complex research and development acquisitions, but may be
used in other appropriate acquisitions,.....).
292. SUSAN MONGA, U.S. SMALL BusnEss ADrmsrrrorA--i--SmA.L Busmrss POOL Gui-
DANCE (on file with author).
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for remediation work let by the federal government. Teaming ar-
rangements allow firms of different sizes to combine to compete for,
in this case, federal environmental remediation work.293
Since firms of differing sizes can combine for purposes of submit-
ting an offer and performing work, generally they can be allowed only
to compete on an unrestricted basis.294 In fact, the federal govern-
ment, particularly, DoD and DoE, have gone on record to encourage
the use of small business consortia and teaming arrangements to com-
pete, on an unrestricted basis, for environmental remediation work.295
It is reasonable to presume that the use of teaming arrangements
would increase the likelihood that small business participation would
increase in nontraditional federal procurements. In addition, small
businesses working together on larger contracts would facilitate the
sharing of valuable information and expertise.
Teaming arrangements are attractive to both small and large con-
tractors and the federal government.296 Obviously, small firms receive
valuable experience from working alongside their larger team mem-
bers. In addition, small firms become exposed to more contractors
that provide remediation services to the government, resulting in the
opportunity to form business relationships that can endure past the
life of a remediation project. Large contractors that lead a team also
can benefit from the arrangement. The obvious benefits include, but
are not limited to, the following: meeting or exceeding a solicitation's
requirement to set-aside a certain percentage of subcontracting dol-
lars to small businesses; creating a larger base of knowledgeable and
effective subcontractors, thereby increasing competition for future
remediation subcontracts; and providing an opportunity to establish a
unitary methodology to compete for and perform remediation work,
by including all team members in all stages of the procurement.
The benefits of teaming have been proven by the Air Force. The
Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence awarded eighteen in-
293. See FAR § 9.603. "The Government will recognize the integrity and validity of contrac-
tor team arrangements; provided, the arrangements are identified and company relationships are
fully disclosed in an offer...
294. Id.
295. Review of the SBA Procurement Assistance Programs: Hearings Before the House
Comm. on Small Business, 104th Cong. 70 (1995) (testimony of Anthony J. DeLuca, Director of
the Air Force Office of Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization).
296. Contractor team arrangements may be desirable from both a government and industry
standpoint, because the companies involved are able to complement each other's unique capabil-




definite-delivery, indefinite-quantity contracts with a potential value
of $1.24 billion.2 97 The awards included two nationwide and sixteen
base specific awards contemplating full-service remediation work.
The Air Force received seventy-four proposals for nineteen contracts,
with ten contractor teams winning all eighteen awards.2 98 An industry
observer noted that the "who's who" of environmental cleanup were
completely shut out from receiving any awards.299 The Air Force re-
fused to release the disappointed offerors, but one Air Force official
acknowledged that "quite a few big companies did not make the cut as
team leaders." '
The same benefits of teaming also inure to small businesses that
combine to compete for environmental remediation work.30 1 Of the
eighteen contracts awarded by the Air Force, four small businesses
received the prime contracts.3"2 All four small business firms led a
team that consisted of one large firm.30 3 Although none of the small
businesses awarded prime contracts teamed with other small busi-
nesses to receive awards, the small business primes will gain signifi-
cant expertise in environmental remediation work such that in later
cleanup procurements, these same primes will be able to provide a
teaming or mentor-protdg6 opportunity for other small and small dis-
advantaged businesses.
The award of the four contracts to small business primes, two
awarded on an unrestricted basis and two on a set-aside basis, is signif-
icant, because the Air Force originally intended to award five to seven
nationwide awards.30 4 The significance of this acquisition plan is
clear. Had the Air Force continued with its plan, it is unlikely that any
small businesses would have been able to successfully compete for the
remediation work. The SBA interjected prior to the Air Force's ad-
vertisement of its requirements and protested the nationwide procure-
297. Mary Powers, Air Force Awards 18 Contracts Worth $1.24 Billion; Jacobs a Big Winner,




301. Teaming arrangements with only small business participants are often referred to as
Pooling arrangements. Pooling arrangements by various small businesses that join together to
compete on a set-aside or unrestricted basis have the benefit of maintaining their small business
status, despite the aggregate number of employees created as a result of the arrangement. See
MoNGA, supra note 292.





ment plan.3 0 5  The SBA recognized that bundling the large
remediation requirements into large regional contracts would exclude
small businesses from any meaningful participation. The SBA sug-
gested, and the Air Force agreed, that awarding contracts on a base
level, rather than on a nationwide level, made the contracts small
enough for small businesses to effectively compete.30 6
In the end, the mix of awards to teams headed by large and small
businesses demonstrated the continued existence of competition in
the federal procurement process and the great strides that small busi-
nesses have made in participating in nontraditional procurements.
However, the Air Force did cite one drawback to the teaming ar-
rangement system. Air Force officials stated that the arrangements
made evaluating each firm tedious and time consuming.3 0 7 Despite
the tedium, it is apparent that competition was received from firms of
all sizes. The administrative complexities of evaluating teaming ar-
rangements is dwarfed when compared to both the expanded base of
potential sources providing remediation services and the lower prices
received by the government because of greater competition.
C. TERC Subcontracts
The history of TERC contracts has been that large businesses
have received all of the Corps' remediation awards.30 8 Even though
DoD has small and small disadvantaged business goals, these firms
rarely see a significant share of the TERC market.30 9 The Corps, rec-
ognizing the political ramifications associated with the de facto exclu-
sion of small businesses from performing environmental remediation
work under TERCs, concluded that the best way to include small
businesses in this industry would be to evaluate a large business's pro-
posal, considering as a significant factor, the amount of actual contract
dollars being awarded to small and small disadvantaged businesses
performing remediation work as subcontractors.31 0
During source selection, the Corps includes the use of small busi-
nesses as a significant factor in four areas of a large business's propo-
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Powers, supra note 297.
308. Interview with Bert Milliken, Office of the Principal Assistant Responsible for Con-






sal.31 ' Although it is not appropriate to inform offerors of the weights
given to evaluation factors, the Corps has stated that a score of not
less than ten percent and not more than fifteen percent can be re-
ceived by an offeror that proposes significant small business subcon-
tractor involvement.3 12
In the first four TERC solicitations, large contractors did not take
the small business subcontractor involvement factor very seriously." 3
According to the Corps, the result of the ambivalence of large con-
tractors in taking this evaluation factor seriously was disappointment
in not receiving an award.31 4 For example, in response to the first
TERC solicitation, nineteen offerors submitted proposals.3
15 Of
those, only six offerors were included in the competitive range.316 In
debriefings, unsuccessful offerors found that because they did not
have meaningful subcontracting plans, they lost valuable points when
evaluated on the utilization of small businesses as subcontractors. 317
The Corps believes that the multi-year feature of the TERC con-
tract provides for meaningful small business participation as subcon-
tractors because large remediation contractors are more willing to
take on small or small disadvantaged businesses and train them in per-
formance of remediation work.31 8 If TERC contracts did not have
this multi-year feature, contract officials are positive that small and
small disadvantaged businesses would be completely shut out of the
remediation industry.1 9
The subcontracting goals that the Corps places in its TERC con-
tracts are forty percent of subcontracting dollars to small businesses
and eight percent for small disadvantaged businesses.320 The eight
percent goal is included in the forty percent small business goal.32'
Initially, the Corps believed that these goals were quite high, since it
had never been able to achieve these goals in other procurements.3'
However, under TERCs, the Corps has seen large remediation con-
311. See TERC ACQUISIION PLAN, supra note 12.










322. See Milliken Interview, supra note 308.
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tractors submit proposals with subcontracting goals of approximately
sixty percent of contract dollars to small businesses, and ten to fifteen
percent of the contract dollars going to small disadvantaged
businesses.32
According to the Corps, small businesses have a distinct advan-
tage over large businesses in the TERC arena as subcontractors.
3 24
Small businesses tend to be more attractive to large remediation
prime contractors because a small business's overhead costs are often
much lower than that of a large business.32 The benefit to the large
remediation prime is that when cost reasonableness or realism is eval-
uated, use of small businesses as subcontractors will invariably reduce
the entire cost of the prime's proposal. 26 In fact, the Corps has found
that if a large remediation contractor does not use small businesses as
subcontractors, they will find it extremely difficult to win a large
remediation contract. 27
After deciding to evaluate a prime's subcontracting plan, the
Corps found that the market to hire small and small disadvantaged
businesses to perform remediation work became extremely competi-
tive.328 Large prime remediation contractors became very innovative
in how they decided to incorporate small and small disadvantaged
businesses in the environmental remediation services industry.32 9 For
instance, large businesses have subcontracted with historically black
colleges or minority institutions to perform laboratory work.330 In ad-
dition, large businesses have sought out various small and small disad-
vantaged businesses prior to issuance of any solicitation for
remediation work and have teamed with them early to prepare them
for future competition. 33
The Corps has found that small and small disadvantaged busi-
nesses have succeeded as TERC subcontractors. 32 In order to con-




326. Id. Small businesses have lower overhead because they do not have laboratories, large
corporate offices, or large payrolls. Therefore, a small business's composite or indirect overhead
rate is in the neighborhood of $30 per hour as compared to a large business with a burden rate of
approximately $90 per hour.





332. See Milliken Interview, supra note 308.
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remediation contractors on their previous subcontracting plans, and
the level of involvement of the subcontractors on those prior con-
tracts.333 The Corps believes that, by continuing to evaluate and score
present subcontracting plans and also by beginning to score as a signif-
icant factor, the amount of contract dollars paid to small and small
disadvantaged businesses for remediation work performed under pre-
vious TERC procurements, small business involvement in environ-
mental remediation work will become more competitive and the
federal government will continue to receive cost efficient, effective,
and timely cleanup services.a3
V. IMPEDIMENTS TO SMALL BUSINESS INVOLVEMENT
IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP MARKET
Simply stated, the absence of many small businesses in environ-
mental remediation contracting is the result of the trend in the De-
partment of Defense and other federal agencies to structure cleanup
contracts to be fairly large, comprehensive remediation efforts.335 Ac-
cordingly, truly small businesses are being excluded from meaningful
participation as prime contractors, and few are participating signifi-
cantly as subcontractors in these types of procurements.3 6
It is apparent that defense cleanup procurement offices are driv-
ing the definition of small business higher and higher by continuously
writing mega, full service contracts out of the reach of many-smaller
companies.337 The Departments of Defense and Energy both rely on
the argument that larger projects are more cost-effective and expedi-
tious than a series of smaller contracts for the same work.338
In addition to the government's propensity to write larger
cleanup contracts, other factors contribute to the absence of small
businesses in the environmental remediation services industry. Other
factors which continue to hamper the success of small businesses in
333. Id. This form of evaluation is similar to the evaluation of a contractors past
performance.
334. Id.
335. See, 59 Fed. Reg. 47,236.
336. Id.
337. See SBA Hears Small Business Concerns, supra note 251.
338. Id. This view, in the long run, may be more detrimental to the federal government,
because many contractors, large and small, have decided to reduce or eliminate their exposure to
high-risk government contracts. These firms believe that they are being forced to "bet the com-
pany" when they bid on major clean up projects, because such contracts present risks of cata-
strophic uninsured environmental liabilities. See John F. Seymour, Liability of Government
Contractors for Environmental Damage, 21 Pun. CoNT. LJ. 491 (1992).
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their attempts to do business with the government include: limited ac-
cess to government indemnification; perceptions that small businesses
possess limited skill levels to perform cleanup; restricted access to
surety bonds; limited access to capital; and competition from medium
and large firms for subcontracts.
A. Lack of Adequate Government Indemnification
Due to the swift realization that providing environmental
remediation services to the federal government may result in a certain
level of financial risk,3 39 contractors have lobbied the government for
adequate indemnification agreements.3 4 Government indemnifica-
339. Id. A contractor
could be subject to fines and penalties [for violating federal, state, or local environmen-
tal laws]. A contractor could also be subject to federal or state orders compelling
cleanup of pro perty... contaminated during the course of work. Third, a contractor
could be held liable for the costs of remediating sites to which hazardous substances
generated by the contractor are transported for treatment, storage, or disposal. Fourth,
a contractor could be sued by third parties under a variety of traditional tort theories,
including: strict liability, trespass, nuisance, and negligence for personal injury or prop-
erty damage. Finally, a contractor could be sued by the agency for breach of contract,
or find various costs disallowed, because of environmental harm caused or aggravated
during the work.
Id. at 492.
340. Chris M. Amantea & Stephen C. Jones, The Growth of Environmental Issues in Govern-
ment Contracting, 43 Am. U.L Rav. 1585, 1629 (1994).
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tion provisions and laws are found in the FAR,3 4 ' the CERCLA,342
and in Pub. L. No. 85-804.a43
341. FAR, 48 C.F.R. pt. 52.228-7, Insurance Liability to Third Persons, states in pertinent
part:
(c) ... the Contractor shall be reimbursed-
'(c)(2) for certain liabilities (and expenses incidental to such liabilities) to third
persons not compensated by insurance or otherwise without regard to and
as an exception to the limitation of cost or the limitation of funds clause of
this contract. These liabilities must arise out of the performance of this con-
tract, whether or not caused by the negligence of the Contractor or of the
Contractor's agents, servants, or employees, and must be represented by
final judgments or settlements approved in writing by the Government.
These liabilities are for-
(i) Losses of or damage to property (other than property owned, occupied,
or used by the Contractor, rented to the Contractor, or in the care,
custody, or control of the Contractor); or
(ii) Death or bodily injury.
(d) The Government's liability under paragraph (c) of this clause is subject to the avail-
ability of appropriated funds at the time a contingency occurs. Nothing in this con-
tract shall be construed as implying that Congress will, at a later date, appropriate
funds sufficient to meet deficiencies.
(e) The Contractor shall not be reimbursed for liabilities (and expenses incidental to
such liabilities)-
(1) For which the Contractor is otherwise responsible under the express terms of
any clause specified in the Schedule or elsewhere in the contract;
(2) For which the Contractor has failed to insure or to maintain insurance as re-
quired by the Contracting Officer; or
(3) That result from willful misconduct or lack of good faith on the part of any of
the Contractor's directors, officers managers, superintendents, or other repre-
sentatives who have supervision or direction of-
(i) All or substantially all of the Contractor's business.
342. Section 119 of CERCLA, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9619, provides:
(a)(1) ... a response action Contractor with respect to any release or threatened re-
lease of a hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant from a vessel or
facility shall not be liable under any other Federal law to any person for injuries,
costs, damages, expenses, or other liability, (including but not limited to claims
for indemnification or contribution and claims by third parties for death, per-
sonal injury, illness or loss of or damage to property or economic loss) which
results from such release or threatened release....
(c)(1) The President may agree to hold harmless and indemnify any response action
Contractor meeting the requirements of this subsection against liability (includ-
ing the expenses of litigation or settlement) for negligence arising out of the
Contractor's performance in carrying out response action activities under this
title, unless such liability was caused by conduct of the Contractor which was
grossly negligent or which constituted intentional misconduct.
343. Public Law 85-804, 72 Stat. 972 (1958), provides, in pertinent part:
the President may authorize any department or agency of the Government which exer-
cises functions in connection with the national defense, acting in accordance with regu-
lations prescribed by the President for the protection of the Government, to enter into
contracts or into amendments or modifications of contracts heretofore or hereafter
made and to make advance payments thereon, without regard to other provisions of
law relating to the making, performance, amendment, or modification of contracts,
whenever he deems that such action would facilitate the national defense.
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1. Third Party Liability and Indemnification
The indemnification provision of the FAR may be included in
government contracts.344 According to the FAR provision, the gov-
ernment will indemnify a government contractor for property liability,
death, or bodily injury, so long as the contractor remains in compli-
ance with insurance requirements, and has not acted in a grossly negli-
gent manner. Several restrictions, however, are imposed on the use of
the FAR indemnification provision. Namely, the government only
can assume liability to the extent that funds have been appropriated
and are available, and the government limits the use of the indemnifi-
cation provision to liabilities not compensated by insurance.
345
Although FAR § 52.228-7, Insurance Liability to Third Persons, pro-
vides, in certain circumstances, indemnification to the prime contrac-
tor for liabilities arising out of the performance of the contract, this
limited form of insurance has no significant impact on the risks borne
by contractors, large or small, contemplating performance of environ-
mental remediation services because of the varied restrictions incident
to this contract clause.
346
2. Superfund Indemnification
Another type of indemnification, created expressly to address en-
vironmental risks associated with cleanup, is the response action con-
tract authorized under CERCLA.347 Section 119 of CERCLA was
enacted partly as a response to the contracting community's concerns
that existing indemnity provisions were inadequate to ensure the
availability of willing and capable response action contractors to par-
ticipate in the environmental remediation and cleanup industry. 48
Superfund indemnification provides limited, automatic rights to in-
demnification for response action contractors based upon an agency's
authority to enter into indemnification agreements.349
344. FAR, 48 C.F.R. pt. 28311-2 states, in pertinent part, that the liability to third persons
provision shall be inserted in solicitations and contracts, other than those for construction con-
tracts and architect-engineer services, when a cost reimbursement contract is contemplated.
345. See FAR, 48 C.F.R. pt. 52.228-7.
346. This clause is only applicable to claims brought by private parties against the contractor
under traditional tort theories, such as trespass, nuisance, strict liability, and negligence for prop-
erty damage and personal injury. Id.; see Seymour, supra note 338, at 534.
347. See 42 U.S.C. § 9619.
348. U.S. General Accounting Office, Contractors Are Being Too Liberally Indemnified by
the Government, REP. To CONG., GAO Rep. No. RCED-89-160 (Sept. 1989).
349. See 42 U.S.C. § 9619.
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Superfund indemnification is, as a practical matter, applicable
only to contracts between federal entities and the designated response
action contractor performing pursuant to the prime contract.350 In ad-
dition, a federal agency's ability to indemnify a prime contractor is
contingent upon three criteria: first, the contractor must demonstrate
that it was unable to procure insurance, at a fair and reasonable price,
in excess of the liability;351 second, the contractor must show that in-
surance to cover the liability was unavailable;35 2 and, finally, the con-
tractor must demonstrate that it made diligent efforts to obtain
insurance coverage from a non-federal source.
353
The indemnification component of Superfund insulates response
action contractors from liability under CERCLA and any other fed-
eral law for any cost, damage, expense, or other liability arising from a
release of hazardous substances, provided the contractor was not neg-
ligent, grossly negligent, and did not engage in intentional miscon-
duct.354 The discretionary indemnification component of CERCLA
permits federal entities to agree to hold harmless and indemnify any
response action contractor against liability for negligence arising out
of the contractor's performance in carrying out response activities
under CERCLA, unless the liability was caused by conduct of the
contractor that is grossly negligent or which constitutes intentional
misconduct.355
Despite the range of Superfund indemnification, it is not broad
enough to protect contractors from state common law suits based
upon the theory of strict liability in tort.35 6 Strict liability actions carry
the lowest standard of proof, therefore, third party claimants may
move successfully against a contractor performing environmental re-
sponse and remediation. Absent indemnification, the costs associated
with performing environmental remediation work will be prohibitive
to small businesses, because they do not have the necessary resources
to obtain adequate insurance protection. Special insurance programs
or government indemnification agreements with reasonable sliding
scale deductibles would provide an incentive for responsible small










tal remediation work, while ensuring proper performance in accord-
ance with contract requirements.357
3. Indemnification Under Public Law Number 85-804
The powers granted to the President by Public Law Number 85-
804, the National Defense Contracts Act, allow him to offer financial
or other forms of relief to government contractors, even if the govern-
ment has no legal obligation to grant such relief or the proposed relief
is prohibited by other statutes or by common law.358 The purpose of
this authority is to allow the President to enter into agreements, inter
alia, which would facilitate national defense and, in turn, provide pro-
tection to the government. This authority allows the President to ex-
tend protection to government contractors from financial harms not
reimbursable otherwise under applicable FAR provisions or the
Superfuid. 59 Congress specifically expressed its intent that 85-804 be
used to facilitate the indemnification of defense contractors, but also
cautioned that the authority to indemnify is an extraordinary remedy,
not to be used when other adequate legal remedies exist.3 6°
This presidential indemnification is extremely broad. In fact, it
covers all claims and losses that are not caused by willful misconduct
or lack of good faith on the part of the contractor's directors, officers,
or principal officials.361 Despite its breadth, federal agencies remain
reluctant to offer 85-804 indemnification. This trepidation stems from
the lack of a clear and consistent definition of "unusually hazardous
risk" that must be demonstrated in order to justify the use of 85-804
indemnification. 62 Moreover, the requirement to seek approval of
85-804 indemnity at the Secretary level, if the agreement will commit
the government to pay in excess of $50,000, often deters agency offi-
357. In fixed price contracts, where either no indemnification agreements are offered or
reached, or minimal indemnification is granted, a bidder will offer a low price, regardless of the
value of the indemnification and the agency will select the lowest bid. This approach favors large
companies that can self-insure or very small firms that bid without indemnity, because they have
no firm assets to lose. Id. at 543.
358. See 50 U.S.C. § 1431.
359. Id.
360. See Seymour, supra note 338, at 543.
361. Id.
362. Executive Order 10,789, which must be read in conjunction with Pub. L. No. 85-804,
states that an unlimited indemnity can be granted for losses arising out of or resulting from risks
that a contract, between the government and a contractor, defines as unusually hazardous or
nuclear in nature. See Exec. Order No. 10,789,23 Fed. Reg. 8897 (1958), reprinted as amended in
50 U.S.C. § 1431 (1996).
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cials and contractors from requesting this remedy.363 Clearly, small
businesses would benefit greatly from federal agency use of Public
Law Number 85-804, because these firms would not be required to
"bet the company" to perform environmental remediation work.
While 85-804 has been used sparingly, circumstances such as the im-
mediate remediation of contaminated sites that present a threat to
human health and the environment likely fall within the parameters of
"unusually hazardous risks," thereby justifying its use to pay contrac-
tors, especially those that are small, for their cleanup efforts on behalf
of the federal government.
B. Procurement Complexity; Insufficient Skill Level to Properly
Perform Cleanup
The federal government perceives that it is difficult to involve
small and small disadvantaged businesses in the cleanup contracting
process as prime contractors because of the size and complexity of
hazardous waste cleanup projects, necessary bonding and liability is-
sues, health and safety training, and the level and extent of technical
and other types of expertise required to perform the work.3 4 Accord-
ingly, the federal government has placed its focus on using the subcon-
tracting arena to ensure small and small disadvantaged business
involvement in the cleanup field.
1. Contracting Officer's Responsibility Determinations can be an
Obstacle for Small Businesses
The size and complexity of a procurement has a direct impact on
whether a small business will be deemed responsible to perform
agency requirements. Even more important, however, is the con-
tracting officer's perception as to the responsibility of a small business
to perform agency work. In the case of environmental remediation
work, the majority of contracting officers maintain that small busi-
nesses are not capable of performing under large, complex cleanup
contracts.365 For example, in Standard Testing and Engineering Com-
pany,3 66 the Air Force issued a solicitation, on a partial small business
set-aside basis, for the acquisition of environmental support services
363. See Seymour, supra note 338.
364. Interview with Diane Sisson, Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization Officer,
Headquarters, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Aug. 24, 1995) [hereinafter Sisson Interview].
365. Id.
366. Standard Testing and Engineering Co., B-256644, 94-2 CPD 17 (1994).
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at two of its major bases. The Air Force contemplated awarding four
indefinite-delivery, indefinite-quantity contracts with a guaranteed
minimum order of $1 million, but having a potential total value of
$190 million.
Standard, a small business, attended the Air Force's pre-proposal
conference, at which time, the agency made assurances that one of the
four contracts would be reserved for small business. Accordingly,
Standard submitted its proposal. Subsequently, the Air Force advised
Standard that its surety did not indicate whether it would issue a one
hundred percent bond, as required by the solicitation, that would
cover at least one-quarter of the overall contract maximum of $190
million over five years. 67 Standard informed the Air Force that its
proposed surety would write bonds for up to $5 million per delivery
order and for an aggregate amount of $8 million. After receiving
Standard's explanation, the Air Force requested clarification regard-
ing Standard's plan to provide additional bonding. Furthermore, the
Air Force informed Standard that the solicitation would be amended
to remove the set-aside.
The Comptroller General did not decide, on the merits, Stan-
dard's challenge to the Air Force's dissolution of the partial set-aside,
because Standard failed to raise this ground for protest before the
next closing date for receipt of proposals. The procedural decision in
Standard left the agency's action of dissolving the set-aside unex-
plained. However, it is a fair assumption that the set-aside was dis-
solved once the Air Force concluded that a small business could not
obtain one hundred percent bonding for one quarter of the potential
total value of the contracts. The requirement for one hundred percent
bonding for a contract, which could only potentially exceed the guar-
anteed $1 million order, created an inherent bias against Standard and
other small businesses similarly situated, since the Air Force required
bonding for approximately $47 million, not the actual amount of fu-
ture delivery orders. Had Standard been able to secure one hundred
percent bonding for the Air Force's project, it probably would not
have been able to bid on any other contracts until the completion of
the Air Force project. Since Standard could not meet the Air Force's
367. According to the FAR, a contractor is not required to obtain bonding for the total
potential value of the contracts, rather, the amount of bonding required is that value which
represents the amount of each delivery order. See infra text accompanying note 398.
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stringent bonding requirements, its offer was down scored by the con-
tracting officer.
3 68
The contracting officer's negative perceptions about the capabil-
ity of small businesses to perform remediation work can be detrimen-
tal because of the breadth of the contracting officer's discretion.3 69 A
contracting officer, in any federal procurement must make an affirma-
tive determination of responsibility before awarding a contract.3 7 0 If a
contracting officer determines that there is no clear indication that a
prospective contractor is responsible, she is required to make a deter-
mination of nonresponsibility.
371
Responsibility of a prospective contractor is determined by ana-
lyzing relevant information that is either obtained from the contractor
or from other contracting activities. 72 For instance, a responsibility
determination is based upon the following: adequate financial re-
sources to perform the contract,373 or the ability to obtain the re-
sources;374 ability to comply with the required or proposed delivery or
performance schedule, taking into consideration other business com-
mitments;375 satisfactory record of past performance;37 6 satisfactory
record of integrity and business ethics;3 77 adequate operational experi-
ence commensurate with the agency's requirements; 37 access to or
possession of the necessary production, construction, and technical
368. Although the Air Force downscored Standard's offer, the result was the de facto dis-
qualification or rejection of Standard as nonresponsible, because Standard could not acquire a
bonding commitment for one hundred percent of the value of the total contract. Standard had
no chance of receiving award because the contracting officer concluded that Standard was not
able to obtain the required bonding and, therefore, represented an unacceptable risk to the
government. Despite the distinction between a firm's ability to obtain bonding and a firm's
capability and willingness to perform environmental remediation work, decisions regarding the
perceived inadequacy of proposed bonding by small businesses for environmental cleanup work
continue to affect the responsibility determinations of small businesses.
369. See FAR, 48 C.F.R. pt 9.103(b).
370. Id.
371. Id. Generally, a nonresponsibility determination only bars a prospective contractor
from competing or receiving award in the subject procurement. That same contractor is not
precluded from competing in other federal procurements. However, if a prospective contractor
is repeatedly found nonresponsible, that contractor is de facto suspended or debarred.
372. See FAR, 48 C.F.R. pt. 9.101.
373. See FAR, 48 C.F.R. pt. 9.104-1(a).
374. A prospective contractor can satisfy the financial resources requirement by demonstrat-
ing that the contract will be performed by subcontracting. The contractor must provide accepta-
ble evidence of a commitment or explicit arrangement, that will be in existence at the time of
contract award, to rent, purchase, or otherwise acquire the needed facilities, equipment, or other
resources, or personnel in order to be deemed responsible. See FAR, 48 C.F.R. pt. 9.104-3(b).
375. See FAR, 48 C.F.R. pt. 9.104-1(b).
376. See FAR, 48 C.F.R. pt. 9.104-1(c).
377. See FAR, 48 C.F.R. pt. 9.104-1(d).
378. See FAR, 48 C.F.R. pt. 9.104-1(e).
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equipment and facilities required to satisfy the agency's require-
ments;379 and remain otherwise qualified and eligible to receive an
award under applicable laws and regulations.
3 80
Although contracting officers have wide discretion to make re-
sponsibility determinations, small businesses have a recourse in the
event they receive a nonresponsibility determination pursuant to an
environmental remediation procurement. If a contracting officer de-
termines that a small business is not responsible to perform remedia-
tion work, the contracting officer must make a referral to the SBA
citing why the small business contractor was found nonresponsible.3 8'
The small business is then given the opportunity to apply to the SBA
for a Certificate of Competency (CoC).3 2 If the SBA issues a CoC to
the small business, the referring agency is advised that the small busi-
ness is deemed responsible by the SBA and the agency is encouraged
to proceed with the procurement based upon that conclusion.8
3
Most, if not all, contracting officers are in the business of assuring
that agency requirements are performed quickly, properly, and cost
effectively. As stated earlier, to achieve the goal of remediating con-
taminated sites and installations, contracting officers seek to employ
those contracting tools that will result in expedient and cost efficient
cleanup. However, federal agencies, particularly DoD and DoE, are
relying, to a large extent, on the use of mega contracts to perform
cleanup. The increased use of these mega contracts often requires na-
tionwide performance. In many instances, the use of total package
contracts contradicts the equally important federal goal of placing
more contracting opportunities with small businesses. This socio-eco-
nomic goal is important, because the federal government must ensure
that its industrial base of environmental cleanup contractors is in-
creased and that the amount of competition expands along with the
growing cleanup market. The larger the remediation contract, the
more difficult it becomes for truly small businesses to receive
favorable responsibility determinations because of the inherent insti-
379. See FAR, 48 C.F.R. pt. 9.104-1(1).
380. See FAR, 48 C.F.R. pt. 9.104-1(g).
381. See FAR, 48 C.F.R. pt. 19.602-2.
382. A Certificate of Competency is a certificate issued by the Small Business Administra-
tion stating that the holder is responsible (with respect to all elements of responsibility, including
but not limited to capability, competency, capacity, credit, integrity, perseverance, and tenacity)
for the purpose of receiving and performing a specific government contract. See FAR, 48 C.F.R.
pt. 19.601(a).
383. See FAR, 48 C.F.R. pt. 19.602-2.
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tutional bias that small businesses are incapable of garnering the req-
uisite financial support, experience, and capital necessary to perform
remediation work.38
In this regard, it has been demonstrated, only as a result of SBA
prodding, that nationwide procurements need not be used continu-
ously to support cleanup, especially where work can be done region-
ally.385 If bundled remediation procurements are broken out into
separate acquisitions, positive responsibility determinations by con-
tracting officers would surely increase. Small businesses would be
more capable, willing, and able to obtain the required capital and re-
sources needed to perform cleanup work. More importantly, small
businesses would be able to augment their past performance histories,
thereby allowing contracting officers in future procurements to iden-
tify them as potential competitors for environmental remediation
work.
2. Prime Contractor Selection of Subcontractor can Hinder Small
Business Participation in Environmental Remediation
Contracts
Another obstacle for small businesses seeking opportunities to
develop experience in environmental remediation, is the inability to
be chosen as subcontractors. For small businesses that are not en-
rolled in the SBA's 8(a) program, failure to be chosen as a subcontrac-
tor directly affects those businesses' viability and longevity. Large
firms that are awarded remediation contracts will either use other
large, established firms as subcontractors, and vice versa, or use
smaller firms with which it has become professionally acquainted.
Although this practice is common and practical, its result is to severely
diminish opportunities for small, small disadvantaged, and women-
owned businesses seeking remediation work. The federal government
cannot be responsible for the private sector diminution in subcontract-
ing opportunities. However, the federal government, in the interest of
maintaining entrepreneurial spirit and a viable contractor base, has
the responsibility of ensuring participation of all sized businesses in
federal procurement.
Those firms which are 8(a) contractors or are small businesses
providing work under federal contracts face similar obstacles. Federal
384. Sisson Interview, supra note 364.
385. Powers, supra note 297.
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agencies are concerned about meeting their small business participa-
tion goals. 8 6 Since these goals are defined in the amount of contract
dollars awarded per year, there is little or no emphasis placed on
achieving these goals in each industry, especially in those industries
with high skill or technical requirements.3s The result is that reaching
the contract dollar goal becomes paramount to ensuring the growth
and self-sufficiency of a significant portion of the small business
community.
In addition, because goal accomplishment is measured by the
award of contract and subcontract dollars to small businesses, the
SBA is not encouraged to spread remediation opportunities around to
all of its 8(a) program participants that may be capable of performing
cleanup work. Instead, most contract dollars for this work will go to
only a few 8(a) firms that are considered the cream of the program. In
this regard, awards within targeted groups go to those businesses that
are more likely to succeed, rather than to those businesses with poten-
tial, and a greater need for work.
Federal agencies also target those small businesses with which
they have had prior dealings in the cleanup of sites or installations.
38 8
Even though requirements are advertised and competition can come
from any small business interested in performing remediation work, it
cannot be ignored that statements of work and solicitations are specif-
ically written around certain firms that have had previous experience
in the type of remediation required by the agency.3 89 All of these bi-
ases demonstrate that mechanisms are required, and must be devel-
oped to allow small businesses to make inroads into the
environmental remediation services industry.
C. Restricted Access to Surety Bonds
Federal law currently requires contractors to provide certain
types of surety bonds3 90 on all federal construction contracts worth
over $25,000.391 There are three types of surety bonds. The first is a
386. Agencies Fall Short in Meeting Contracting Goals for A-E Services, 65 FED. COWT. REP.
12 (1991).
387. Id.
388. Sisson Interview, supra note 364.
389. 59 Fed. Reg. 47,236 (1994).
390. Bonding is a three party agreement whereby the surety guarantees the owner or agency
issuing a contract that the contractor or subcontractor will perform the contract. See FAR, 48
C.F.R. pt. 28.001.
391. The FASA increased this amount to $100,000, effective October 1, 1995.
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bid bond.3" A bid bond ensures that the bidder will not withdraw its
bid within the time period specified for acceptance and, if its bid is
accepted, will enter into a written contract and will furnish any addi-
tional bonds required.393 The second is a performance bond.3 94 A
performance bond ensures that if the contractor or subcontractor does
not complete the work, the surety will either pay to complete it or pay
up to one hundred percent of the penal amount of the contract.
395
The third is a payment bond.396 A payment bond guarantees that sub-
contractors, suppliers, and employees will be paid for the work per-
formed and/or materials provided under a contract.
397
In addition to the federal government, most state and local gov-
ernments and some private sector lenders also require construction
firms to be bonded. 398 Because of the environmental remediation ser-
vice work requires repairs and alterations to accomplish remedial ac-
tions, many of the firms performing the work are construction firms.
Accordingly, the federal contracts that have remediation as a major
function require the performing contractor to be bonded. In most in-
stances, large prime contractors will also require their subcontractors
to be bonded. Finding adequate bonding to qualify for environmental
remediation work can be difficult and, in some cases, nearly
impossible.
Surety companies, or the entities that issue surety bonds, decide
whether firms have the necessary experience and financial capability
to perform a job and, thus, to qualify for a bond.399 In approving
bonds, surety companies seek to reduce their risk by examining,
among other factors, a firm's experience in construction, specializa-
392. See FAR, 48 C.F.R. pt. 28.101.
393. Id.
394. See FAR, 48 C.F.R. pt. 28.103-2.
395. Id. Performance bonds are required for firm, fixed price construction contracts and
delivery orders, but are discretionary for cost reimbursement contracts. The percentage needed
for performance bonds is flexible. See FAR, 48 C.F.R. pts. 28.102-2(a) and 28.103. The level of
bonding is determined by the contracting officer, based on the level of risk associated with the
project and the resulting need to protect the government's interests. Id.; see also U.S. ARmY
CoRnS OF ENGINEERS, WATER RESoURCES SUPPORT CENTER, INSITuTE FOR WATER RE-
souRCEs, HAzARDoUs ANxD ToXIc WAS-m (HTW) CoNTRAcrnGO PROBLEMS: A STUDY OF TnH
CONTRACTING PROBLEms RELATED TO SuRETY BONDrNG IN THE HTW CLEANup PROGRAM,
IWR REP. No. 90-R-1 (July 1990) [hereinafter HTW SuRETY BoNDING STUDY].
396. See FAR, 48 C.F.R. pt. 28.103-3.
397. Id.
398. U.S. General Accounting Office, Small Business: Construction Firms' Access to Surety





tion and past record in performing the type of work requiring bond-
ing, and financial viability.400 The decisions that bonding companies
make regarding the issuance of bonds have been cited as a distinct
impediment to the development of small firms, especially those owned
by minorities and women.40 '
Smaller construction firms have complained that the surety indus-
try's requirements for a bond are too burdensome, the financial com-
mitment required for a bond is too high, the costs required to prepare
financial information for surety company review are exorbitant, and
the fees charged by sureties make it less than profitable to perform
bonded work.40 2 All of these factors combine together to do one
thing-limit the number of small or small disadvantaged firms in-
volved in the performance of federal work requiring bonding.
The surety industry has indicated that its reluctance to guarantee
performance on remediation construction projects stems from the
concern for possible long term liability exposure and changing state of
the art design requirements associated with environmental cleanup." 3
The unwillingness of sureties to bond smaller firms, otherwise capable
of performing remediation, will drastically affect the environmental
remediation services industry. Small firms will continue to be unable
to perform remediation work because of the unavailability of bonding.
Furthermore, small firms will be unwilling to compete for remediation
work, because they know that they will not receive award of remedia-
tion contracts, so long as government requirements for bonding re-
main stringent.
If small and small disadvantaged firms do not receive bonding at
reasonable prices, only a handful of firms will be available to compete
for remediation work.4 "4 For example, on a typical remediation pro-
400. Id.
401. U.S. General Accounting Office, Small Business: Access to Surety Bonds, GAO Rep.
No. RCED-95-150 (Apr. 5, 1995) (statement by Jim Wells, Associate Director, Housing and
Community Development Issues, Resources, Community, and Economic Development
Division).
402. Id.
403. The surety industry continues to make performance bonds available to certain major
firms competing for cleanup work. These firms either have substantial business with the surety,
major financial assets, and/or a long history of past performance on remediation projects. See
HTW SuREry BoNDwnG STuDY, supra note 395.
404. Surety companies have required that firms provide collateral as a condition for approv-
ing a bond. Surety companies view collateral as a tool that produces a strong commitment from
the firm to successfully complete contract requirements. The collateral is normally a liquid asset
that frequently comes from the contractor's personal assets, rather than from the firm's assets, so
as not to reduce the firm's working capital. See Access to Surety Bonds, supra note 398.
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curement, approximately one hundred firms request plans, but fewer
than seven usually bid.40 5 The many requests for plans and specifica-
tions indicate that more than a few firms are interested in remediation
work. In addition, many of the firms request the plans and specifica-
tions in order to keep up with the remediation market, even if they
are unable to submit an offer for the requested solicitation.40 6 This
interest demonstrates that firms, including small businesses, stand
ready to perform remediation work, if changes in the method of pro-
curing these services are made and if impediments to the environmen-
tal cleanup market are either reduced or removed such that small
business participation in this area would become feasible.
The consequence of the unavailability of bonding for small busi-
nesses and the stringent government bonding requirement is the re-
duction in the number of competitive bids received for federal
remediation projects. This lack of competition will be detrimental to
the federal government, because it will have fewer sources from which
to find contractors capable of meeting remediation requirements.
Furthermore, the federal government will not receive the price bene-
fits that inure as a result of increased competition, or it may experi-
ence project delays due to the shortage of contractors and
subcontractors who can obtain bonding. Ultimately, a reduced level
of competition will result in a higher price paid by the government for
environmental remediation services.
Contractors, large and small, perceive that the problems in con-
tracting for environmental remediation work, to a large extent, are
due to the government's use of contracting procedures initially devel-
oped for non-environmental construction and service contracting.
40 7
The federal government's construction acquisition process does not
account for the increased possibility of liability in excess of traditional
construction projects.40 8 Thus, sureties, when examining the risks as-
sociated with an environmental remediation project, often perceive
the possibility of greater liability on these contracts, thereby resulting
in a decision to deny bonding or place significant monetary limits on
the amount of bonding.40 9 For example, a phenomenon with multi-
405. See HTW SuRETY BONDING STUDY, supra note 395.
406. Id.
407. Gail Corrigan et al., More Small Businesses Needed on Environmental Cleanups, ENGI-
NEERING NEws-REcoRD, at E-17 (1994).
408. Most federal construction work is accomplished with fixed price contracts, therefore,
the federal government does not normally have to account for contingencies. See supra Part I.C.
409. See HTW SuRETY BONDING StUDY, supra note 395.
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discipline environmental remediation contracts, like TERCs and
ERMCs, is a surety's assessment of bonding limits based on the entire
value of a total package contract rather than on each delivery order
written against an indefinite-delivery contract. So long as sureties
continue to use the total potential contract price to compute bond ca-
pacity limitations, no small or small disadvantaged firm will be able to
qualify for the bonding required by the federal government, because
the price for such bonding, by far, will exceed the financial equity of
the small firm.
D. Undercapitalization of Small Businesses
In order for any business, large or small, to operate profitably, it
must have a strong capital base. Nowhere is this more true than in the
environmental remediation services industry. As the regulatory noose
tightens on environmental cleanups, the environmental remediation
market has had to move from drawn out studies to fast paced
remediation. 410
Capital expenditures for the study of environmental contamina-
tion are dwarfed by the cost of the studies that are necessary for the
actual remediation of a site, even though more funds eventually will
be expended on the study of a site than its cleanup.411 Despite this
phenomenon, market predictors indicate that remediation is the fast-
est growing segment of the environmental market in the 1990s.412 As
the market shifts to construction to tackle remediation, it has shifted
also from private sector spending on small scale cleanup contracts to
large, complex public sector projects.413 The twists and turns of the
environmental market make it necessary for small firms to find capital
to either compete for environmental remediation work as primes or
subcontractors, or to attract scientific or engineering firms interested
in expanding or maintaining their market share in the environmental
remediation services industry.
The Small Business Investment Act of 1958 created a program to
help small businesses obtain financing for starting, maintaining, and
410. See TERC AcQUIsroTN PLAN, supra note 12.
411. Of the bulk of the $9 billion environmental consulting market, $5 billion is spent on
hazardous waste studies and remedial design. Another $3 billion is spent on water and waste-
water treatment, and $600 million is spent on project engineering, while $400 million is spent on





expanding operations.4 14 Under the program, small business invest-
ment companies (SBICs) provide financing to small businesses
through equity investments and debt.415 In 1972, Congress amended
the Act to establish a new class of specialized SBICs (SSBICs).416 Us-
ing their own funds as well as government funds provided through the
SBA, SSBICs provide financing to small businesses that are owned by
persons who are socially and economically disadvantaged.417
The SBA administers the SBIC and the SSBIC programs, licenses
the investment companies, and maintains a regulatory oversight func-
tion.418 Under SBA administration, this program has not complied
with SBA guidance on documenting the eligibility of the small busi-
nesses that receive financing.419 This failure to properly document the
eligibility of a small business that received financing may have the ef-
fect of thwarting the purpose of the program-to provide capital to
small and small disadvantaged businesses. If small businesses are un-
able to receive special financing, these firms may find it impossible to
compete in the environmental remediation services industry.
A number of initiatives are presently underway, or are being con-
sidered, to address the capital needs of small and medium sized busi-
nesses. The SBA guaranteed loan program is expanding rapidly.420
Congress is considering additional proposals to create programs that
will help businesses obtain financing.42 In addition, various states
have established loan or venture capital funds to assist local
businesses.42
E. Competition from Large Environmental Remediation
Businesses
The Hazardous Waste Action Coalition (HWAC), an association
of over 110 leading engineering and scientific firms practicing in haz-
ardous waste management, has observed that federal environmental
414. U.S. General Accounting Office, Small Business Administration: Inadequate Documen-













remediation contracts primarily have been awarded to large busi-
nesses.4" HWAC has maintained the position that firms of all sizes
should be given the opportunity to participate in remediation activi-
ties, especially when these remediation activities are available as a re-
sult of government action.424
Critics of significant small business participation in the environ-
mental remediation services industry invariably posit that, because of
the complexity of the federal government's cleanup requirements,
contracts for these requirements are ill suited for performance by
small firms. 4' However, HWAC has found that large, complex fed-
eral contracts often preclude the federal government from obtaining
the hazardous waste expertise that exists within small, small disadvan-
taged, women-owned, and moderate sized businesses.426 In fact,
HWAC believes that by tapping the expertise developed within small
firms and using these firms as prime contractors on significant
remediation projects, the federal government will benefit by way of
increased competition in the industry.4 2 7
Although small firms have typically been the segment of the busi-
ness population that has grown steadily, while employing almost fifty-
four percent of the work force, these same firms have not been as
successful in expanding their businesses to include federal con-
tracts.42 The Departments of Defense and Energy have provided
more environmental contracting opportunities in this decade than in
their combined previous histories.4 2 9 However, small business awards
from DoD during FY94, accounted for twenty-two percent of all
awarded contracts, which totaled $132.2 billion.430 Accordingly, in an
industry that is ninety percent dominated by large businesses, the pro-
portion of environmental remediation contracts awarded to small
businesses continues to shrink, even as the industry grows larger.
Small and medium sized firms have great difficulty in obtaining
federal environmental remediation contracts.431 In many instances,
small firms have been used to provide non-technical services that have











little or no relationship to cleanup or remediation at hazardous waste
sites.432 For example, the non-technical work includes providing se-
curity guards or building fences at hazardous waste sites or military
installations.433
In as much as small business utilization goals are being achieved,
barriers to small business participation in certain areas of federal pro-
curement have remained. However, the reality is that large firms and
the federal government are reporting increased participation by small
businesses in environmental remediation when, in fact, these small
businesses are neither given the opportunity to display their expertise
in providing environmental remediation services, nor are they pro-
vided the chance to hone their experience in this industry. The mis-
leading statistic that socio-economic goals are being met does not take
into account the record exclusion of small businesses from the envi-
ronmental remediation services industry. Continued exclusion from
this industry will be detrimental to small businesses, but more impor-
tantly, the federal government, the entity that will rely, in later years,
on more small firms to provide environmental remediation services at
fair prices.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS TO PROMOTE MEANINGFUL
SMALL BUSINESS PARTICIPATION IN
ENVIRONMENTAL REMEDIATION
CONTRACTING
To achieve the successful promotion of small businesses as viable
participants in the environmental remediation market, several policy
decisions must be integrated and then implemented.* No one avenue
of approach to involving small businesses in remediation will be suc-
cessful. Rather, agencies will have to rethink their cleanup strategies,
the SBA will have to reconsider its position on size standards, and
industry leaders will have to be forward thinking in their approach to
developing small firm capabilities in the environmental remediation
sector.
The significance in having all of these avenues converge at one
point is apparent. Environmental remediation of contaminated sites
will continue to be one of this nation's most important tasks. Environ-
mental remediation not only affects the economic structure of this na-
432. Id.
433. Corrigan, supra note 407.
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tion, it also affects this nation's security. In addition, international
opportunities in environmental remediation have surfaced. There-
fore, the nation will require a strong knowledge base to sustain
remediation efforts at home, while lucrative remediation work draws
larger remediation firms abroad.
Small businesses must stand ready to provide environmental
remediation services when larger firms leave to harness greater envi-
ronmental cleanup opportunities in other countries. In order to sup-
port the development of small businesses in this industry, steps must
be taken now by the proper agencies and officials to ensure that small
businesses obtain experience and opportunities so as to grow with the
environmental remediation services industry.
A. Reevaluate Size Standard for Environmental Remediation
Services
In establishing the 500 employee size standard for environmental
remediation services, the SBA departed from its traditional approach
to determine size in a service/construction industry by the amount of
annual receipts.434 The SBA has pronounced that the size standard
also will apply to federal environmental remediation procurements
that involve three or more environmentally related activities which, in
turn, can be identified in separate industries under the SIC system.435
The 500 employee size standard is, in effect, an increase above the size
standard of $18 million proposed earlier.436 The SBA contends that
the higher size standard is supported by more recent data describing
the industry structure for environmental remediation activity.
437
The SBA has established the current size standard of 500 employ-
ees for federal government procurements meeting the following two
criteria: (1) that the overall purpose of the procurement is to restore a
contaminated environment, and (2) that the procurement is composed
of activities in three or more distinct industries identified with sepa-
rate SIC four digit industry codes, none of which constitute fifty per-
cent or more of the contract's value.438  These criteria were
established to distinguish environmental remediation services from
434. See SIC MANUAL 1987, supra note 155.
435. See 59 Fed. Reg. 47,236, 47,237.
436. See 58 Fed. Reg. 52,452 (1993) (to be codified at 13 C.F.R. pt. 121).
437. See 59 Fed. Reg. 47,236, 47,237.
438. Id.; see also 13 C.F.R. pt. 121.601.
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other environmentally related procurements involving services pri-
marily associated with one particular industry.439
In essence, the result of the 500 employee size standard and the
establishment of the criteria that define environmental remediation is
to provide more government contract opportunities to those firms ca-
pable of and able to sustain an expertise and a practice in three or
more environmentally related areas. This rule results in the wholesale
exclusion of smaller businesses, SDBs, and women-owned businesses
from the environmental remediation industry as prime contractors,
because these firms, for the most part, do not possess multi-discipline
capabilities.
The environmental remediation service activity was designated as
a sub-category under SIC code 8744, Facilities Support Management
Services, because this SIC code has been defined to require the per-
formance of a range of different environmental remediation services
in support of facilities where no one activity may be considered the
primary function in the cleanup of a contaminated site. According to
the SBA, the reason the above criteria and size standards were devel-
oped and modified, respectively, was because of the trend in DoD and
other federal agencies to structure cleanup contracts to be large, com-
prehensive remediation mechanisms.44° In particular, SBA officials
said the size standard was raised, because the SBA found that small
businesses were not competing for the prime contractor position on
mega remediation contracts, mainly due to competition from larger
businesses with greater resources.441 SBA officials noted that, in or-
der to make remediation contracts available to small businesses, the
SBA would have to either break down the mega contracts into smaller
components, or upwardly adjust its definition of what constitutes a
small business for purposes of environmental remediation.4 2
The SBA stated that it chose to implement both options." 3 With
regard to breaking down bundled contracts, the SBA positioned
break-out specialists across the nation. 4 " These specialists have the
responsibility of reviewing all major government contracts to deter-
mine whether the contracts can be subdivided into smaller contracts,





444. See 59 Fed. Reg. 47,236, 47,237.
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which would then be awarded to small businesses."15 The SBA main-
tains that it has no plans to make any other modifications to the 500
employee size standard, due to the validity of the federal govern-
ment's position that single, full service contracts allow for better gov-
ernment oversight and expeditious cleanups."
6
The SBA must consider reevaluating the size standard for envi-
ronmental remediation work. Without question, small businesses are
validly concerned that a 500 employee firm is truly not a small busi-
ness. Therefore, competing against these firms would be fruitless. In
fact, the new size standards have opened the door for an estimated
1,100 companies to compete for environmental remediation contracts
that had been previously determined to be too big to qualify as small
businesses under existing categories for environmental cleanup
work.447 In addition, the increase of the size standard throughout the
environmental remediation services industry also increases the com-
petition small businesses must face for remediation work that is not
covered by a full service or mega contracting tool.
The SBA supports its final rule of 500 employees by stating that
prime contractors will find it easier to achieve their small business
subcontracting goals"8 because of the new size standards." 9 The
SBA presumes that this will provide greater subcontracting opportuni-
ties for small businesses. While some new opportunities will present
themselves to truly small businesses; overall, the result of the in-
creased size standard is the funneling of more opportunities to larger
firms. In fact, the SBA's failure to measure subcontractor employees
against employee based standards will allow newly established 500
employee small businesses to subcontract work to even larger busi-
nesses. In the end, small businesses will not be able to gain the level
of experience and expertise required to successfully compete for
prime contractor opportunities in the field of environmental cleanup.
445. Id.
446. Id.
447. See SBA Opens Doors for Bigger Businesses, DEF. CtEaaMP, Sept. 23, 1994, at 37.
448. Id.
449. Id. These goals will be easier to achieve, because SBA counts subcontractor revenues




B. Reduction in Award of Federal "Mega" Environmental
Remediation Contracts
The Small Business Administration's new size standard for envi-
ronmental remediation has made it tougher for truly small businesses
to garner the prime contractor role in government cleanup contracts.
In addition, the federal government's affinity for awarding mega con-
tracts renders the likelihood of a small business winning one of these
contracts a virtual impossibility. As discussed earlier, DoD and other
federal agencies have a propensity to bundle environmental remedia-
tion requirements. This propensity results in fewer contract opportu-
nities for small businesses and less overall competition received on
government procurements. Much to the dissatisfaction of small busi-
nesses, this trend is not subsiding.45 0 Despite the arguments support-
ing the use of mega contracts, bundling of remediation services
impedes competition. While full service remediation contracts may be
necessary for complex cleanup sites, many other sites do not require
TERC-like coverage in order to effect a proper, timely, and efficient
cleanup. Accordingly, the SBA cannot acquiesce to agency determi-
nations that bundled requirements are the only alternative to com-
plete remediation work. Rather, the SBA must be proactive in its
efforts to sustain small business growth and survival in the remedia-
tion industry, so as to foster continued competition and reduce the
trend of restricting competition to only large businesses in this indus-
try. TERC-like contracts should be used sparingly, especially when it
is determined that remediation work can be performed in smaller
components to accommodate the maxim upon which federal procure-
ment is based-full and open competition.
1. Award Smaller Environmental Remediation Contracts
Clearly, federal procurement officials play the most significant
role in ensuring the existence of opportunities for small businesses.
These officials are responsible for acquiring the agency's minimum
needs by using appropriate contracting tools and methods. It is the
procurement official that is responsible for determining whether the
agency's requirements should be bundled into a single, full service or
mega contract.
Currently, agencies are finding that the use of mega contracts
provide for administrative ease and oversight in the cleanup process.
450. See 59 Fed. Reg. 47,236.
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However, the cost associated with awarding larger contracts is the
diminution of small business participation in environmental con-
tracting. Equally important, however, is the lack of competition that
the federal government will receive in this industry because of the
diminution in small business participation.
In the effort to reinvent government, the current political admin-
istration seeks to run the government like private business. As it so
happens, some small firms are major players in private cleanup con-
tracts.451 For example, an accepted practice in the private sector is to
use smaller firms to help plan and define projects, including remedial
investigation and feasibility studies and the remedial design phases of
a project.452 Then, the remedial action, or construction phase of the
cleanup, is conducted by a larger construction-based firm, with over-
sight and independent monitoring conducted by small firms.45 As
stated above, federal contracts relegate small firms to performance of
just one small portion of the overall cleanup activity, thereby exclud-
ing small firms from project planning and monitoring.
If the federal government placed its focus on awarding small con-
tracts, it would be able to take advantage of the small firm's technical
capability, rather than wasting small firm potential with non-technical
activities purchased to fulfill agency small business goals. Further-
more, with smaller contracts, agencies would be better able to monitor
contractor performance, because smaller contracts would allow the
government to better identify the requirements at each contaminated
site. Moreover, smaller contracts, with better defined statements of
work, would generate wide interest among small firms, because these
firms would be attracted to the actual opportunity to compete success-
fully for environmental remediation work. While this recommenda-
tion may not be attractive from the stand point of the government,
considering agency reliance on mega remediation contracts, the above
reasoning should be revisited continuously, in order to benchmark
whether the legal requirement for full and open competition is being
adhered to in the environmental remediation services industry.





2. Award Geographically Limited Contracts
Another way for the federal government to move away from the
mega contracts covering large areas is to implement site-specific or
geographically limited contracts. By awarding more site specific con-
tracts, the federal government would be able to obtain the specific
services needed for particular jobs from the best firms. Many times,
the best firms are small businesses that perform some type of environ-
mental remediation in the location of the contaminated site.45 4
Smaller firms prove to be better able to respond to such targeted,
geographically limited contracts and have demonstrated the ability to
successfully compete against larger firms when the actual contracts
have been trimmed down.45 5 For example, Environmental Science
Pacific, Inc. (ESP), a minority-owned local business based in Hawaii,
was awarded a $20 million, five year, Air Force contract to perform
removal of underground storage tanks and to provide soil and water
remediation currently at Hickam and Wake Island bases in Hawaii.
ESP's knowledge of the region45 6 and remediation experience in that
area allowed it to team with a large consultant and win award of the
contract.457
As is true in many regions, larger firms performing under nation-
wide contracts will not have the expertise and regional knowledge re-
garding environmental remediation that smaller firms have been able
to obtain as a result of performing in those particular areas. It is this
dynamic that should make smaller firms more attractive to federal
agencies that have identified contaminated sites in specific regions of
the country with unique cleanup needs.
Congress has recognized that awarding contracts to, or at least
seeking out, small businesses engaged in remediation in a particular
region may be in the best interest of the government.5 Specifically,
DoD is required by the National Defense Authorization Act of 1994,
when entering into contracts for environmental services at sites sub-
454. Id.
455. Id.
456. ESP began performing environmental, health, and safety work in Hawaii in 1989. It
started out by working on landfills for the County of Maui, as well as hazardous material and
hazardous waste work with the military. As time passed, the company moved into more techni-
cal work. The company develops its expertise as work comes in and training takes place while
performing remediation work. See Jay McWilliams, Minority Contractor Gets $20 Million Job,
PAc. Bus. NEws, July 25, 1994, at 27.
457. Id.
458. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-160, § 2912,
107 Stat. 1547, 1925 (1993).
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ject to base closure or realignment, to give preference, to the greatest
extent practicable, to qualified businesses located in the vicinity of the
installation and to small and small disadvantaged businesses.459 Con-
gress noted that local businesses often provide added knowledge and
insight regarding site conditions and characteristics of surrounding
areas.
460
C. Agency-Wide Mandate to Implement Permanent Mentor-
Prot6gd Program
As is evident from the previous discussion, any small business
seeking an opportunity to provide environmental remediation services
to the federal government must possess technical expertise and expe-
rience. DoD, by permanently implementing a pilot mentor-prot6g6
program, recognized the need to train more small and small disadvan-
taged businesses in highly complex industries, like environmental
remediation. By mandating this program throughout the federal gov-
ernment, small businesses could develop remediation skills which can
be used on successive, larger contracts. In addition, the federal gov-
ernment will benefit from increasing the knowledge base in these skill
intensive fields.
Mentor-prot6g6 programs require only a small commitment on
behalf of the federal government, because large industry leaders take
on much of the responsibility of providing assistance to small firms.
Therefore, the program does not overburden the government either
with administrative costs or attention. Ultimately, the benefits to the
government are three-fold. The government will receive increased
competition from more sources in the future, increased competition in
the environmental remediation arena will drive down costs to the gov-
ernment, while promoting local economic growth in the areas where
more small businesses are performing cleanup work, and the govern-
ment will benefit as a result of a cleaner environment.
VII. CONCLUSION
Shutting small firms out of the environmental remediation serv-
ices industry, by increasing business size standards and writing mega
cleanup contracts, is a risky practice for a government whose procure-




ment practices are founded upon competition.461  While larger
cleanup contracts seem appealing, the federal government is gambling
with its limited industrial base of contractors that are capable and will-
ing to perform cleanup work.
The federal government must consider its resources before limit-
ing the prime contractor role to large businesses. If the industrial base
of cleanup contractors consists of only large businesses, the federal
government risks paying a premium for cleanup services. In addition,
the government may not be able to timely respond to environmental
cleanup requirements if the majority of its contractors are performing
under already existent mega contracts.
Small businesses must also lobby for recognition in the environ-
mental cleanup industry. Small businesses must take affirmative steps
to involve themselves in issues pertaining to environmental con-
tracting, for example, the SBA's size standard determinations for this
industry. First, small businesses must educate themselves about the
laws and regulations pertaining to their existence. Small businesses
should then determine how these laws and regulations operate within
the context of environmental cleanup contracting.
Second, small businesses should seek teaming or joint venture ar-
rangements to develop skills in the remediation industry. With a
strong skill base in environmental cleanup, teams of small business
contractors will appear attractive to large remediation contractors and
the federal government. Third, small businesses must seek out capital
investors to help finance the risks associated with environmental con-
tracting. If small businesses succeed in regional performance of
cleanup contracting, the community benefitting from the service may
be a future source of financial support for the small business cleanup
contractor. Finally, small businesses must become involved with trade
associations that are in the business of lobbying Congress and other
461. Had the maximum practicable competition standard, passed by the House and reported
in H.R. 1670, been enacted as part of FASA, the federal government would only have had to
provide open access to competition, but only to the extent that full and open competition would
be consistent with the need to fulfill agency requirements. See 64 FED. Corrr. REP. 317 (Oct. 16,
1995). The maximum practicable competition standard is lower than the CICA requirement for
full and open competition, therefore, an agency would have been in a position, under the former
standard, to further restrict competition to those sources that the agency determined would be
competitive under a particular procurement. Applying the maximum practicable competition
standard to TERC-like contracts, an agency could better justify a decision not to allow small
businesses to compete for mega remediation contracts by stating that the agency need for effi-




legislative bodies for changes to laws and regulations that impact the
small business cleanup contractor.
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